ix THE DOCTRINE OP IMMORTALITY 205 



Hume next proceeds to consider the moral 

 arguments, and chiefly 



"... those derived from the justice of God, which is 

 supposed to be further interested in the future punishment 

 of the vicious and reward of the virtuous." 



But if by the justice of God we mean the same 

 attribute which we call justice in ourselves, then 

 why should either reward or punishment be ex- 

 tended beyond this life? * Our sole means of 

 knowing anything is the reasoning faculty which 

 God has given us; and that reasoning faculty 

 not only denies us any conception of a future 

 state, but fails to furnish a single valid argument 

 in favour of the belief that the mind will endure 

 after the dissolution of the body. 



"... If any purpose of nature be clear, we may affirm 

 that the whole scope and intention of man's creation, so 

 far as we can judge by natural reason, is limited to the 

 present life." 



To the argument that the powers of man are so 

 much greater than the needs of this life require, 

 that they suggest a future scene in which they 

 can be employed, Hume replies: 



* " Nor are we therefore authorised to infer d priori, 

 independent of Revelation, a future state of retribution, 

 from the irregularities prevailing in the present life, since 

 that future state does not account fully for these irregu- 

 larities. It may explain, indeed, how present evil may be 

 conducive to future good, but not why the good could not be 

 attained without the evil: it may reconcile with our notions 

 of the divine justice the present prosperity of the wicked, 

 but it does not account for the existence of the wicked." 

 Whately, I. c. pp. 69, 70. 



