CHAPTEE X 

 VOLITION: LIBEKTY AND NECESSITY 



IN the opening paragraphs of the third part of 

 the second book of the " Treatise," Hume gives a 

 description of the will. 



" Of all the immediate effects of pain and pleasure there 

 is none more remarkable than the will ; and though, prop- 

 erly speaking, it be not comprehended among the passions, 

 yet as the full understanding of its nature and properties is 

 necessary to the explanation of them, we shall here make it 

 the subject of our inquiry. I desire it may be observed, 

 that, by the will, I mean nothing but the internal impres- 

 sion we feel, and are conscious of, when we knowingly give 

 rise to any new motion of our body, or new perception of 

 our mind. This impression, like the preceding ones of 

 pride and humility, love and hatred, 'tis impossible to 

 define, and needless to describe any further." (II. p. 150.) 



This description of volition may be criticised on 

 various grounds. More especially does it seem de- 

 fective in restricting the term " will " to that feel- 

 ing which arises when we act, or appear to act, 

 as causes: for one may will to strike, without 

 striking; or to think of something which we have 

 forgotten. 



Every volition is a complex idea composed of 

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