x VOLITION: LIBERTY AND NECESSITY 215 



two elements: the one is the idea of an action; 

 the other is a desire for the occurrence of that 

 action. If I will to strike, I have an idea of a 

 certain movement, and a desire that that move- 

 ment should take place; if I will to think of any 

 subject, or, in other words, to attend to that sub- 

 ject, 1 have an idea of the subject and a strong 

 desire that it should remain present to my con- 

 sciousness. And so far as I can discover, this 

 combination of an idea of an object with an 

 emotion, is everything that can be directly 

 observed in an act of volition. So that Hume's 

 definition may be amended thus: Volition is the 

 impression which arises when the idea of a bodily 

 or mental action is accompanied by the desire that 

 the action should be accomplished. It differs 

 from other desires simply in the fact, that we 

 regard ourselves as possible causes of the action 

 desired. 



Two questions arise, in connexion with the 

 observation of the phenomenon of volition, as 

 they arise out of the contemplation of all other 

 natural phenomena. Firstly, has it a cause; 

 and, if so, what is its cause? Secondly, is it 

 followed by any effect, and if so, what effect does 

 it produce? 



Hume points out, that the nature of the phe- 

 nomena we consider can have nothing to do with 

 the origin of the conception that they are con- 

 nected by the relation of cause and effect. For 



