222 HUME x 



are commonly able to infer them with considerable cer- 

 tainty from their motives, and from the dispositions of 

 the agent ; yet it frequently happens that in performing 

 the actions themselves, we are sensible of something like 

 it: And as all resembling objects are taken for each 

 other, this has been employed as demonstrative and even 

 intuitive proof of human liberty. We felt that our actions 

 are subject to our will on most occasions ; and imagine we 

 feel, that the will itself is subject to nothing, because, 

 when by a denial of it we are provoked to try, we feel 

 that it moves easily every way, and produces an image of 

 itself (or a Velleity as it is called in the schools), even on 

 that side on which it did not settle. This image or faint 

 notion, we persuade ourselves, could at that time have 

 been completed into the thing itself ; because, should that 

 be denied, we find upon a second trial that at present it 

 can. We consider not that the fantastical desire of show- 

 ing liberty is here the motive of our actions." (IV. p. 110, 

 note.) 



Moreover the moment the attempt is made to 

 give a definite meaning to the words, the sup- 

 posed opposition between free will and necessity 

 turns out to be a mere verbal dispute. 



" For what is meant by liberty, when applied to volun- 

 tary actions ? We cannot surely mean, that actions have 

 so little connexion with motive, inclinations, and circum- 

 stances, that one does not follow in a certain degree of uni- 

 formity from the other, and that one affords no inference 

 by which we can conclude the existence of the other. For 

 these are plain and acknowledged matters of fact. By 

 liberty, then, we can only mean a power of acting or not 

 acting according to the determination of the will ; that is, 

 if we choose to remain at rest, we may ; if we choose to 

 move, we also may. Now this hypothetical liberty is uni- 



