236 HUMS xi 



property had been interfered with. Here, indeed, 

 it may be readily shown, that it is as much the 

 interest of society that men should not interfere 

 with one another's freedom, or mutually inflict 

 positive or negative pain, as that they should not 

 meddle with one another's property; and hence 

 the obligation of justice in such matters may be 

 deduced. But, if a man merely thinks ill of an- 

 other, or feels maliciously towards him without 

 due cause, he is properly said to be unjust. In 

 this case it would be hard to prove that any injury 

 is done to society by the evil thought; but there 

 is no question that it will be stigmatised as an 

 injustice; and the offender himself, in another 

 frame of mind, is often ready enough to admit 

 that he has failed to be just towards his neighbour. 

 However, it may plausibly be said, that so slight a 

 barrier lies between thought and speech, that any 

 moral quality attached to the latter is easily trans- 

 ferred to the former; and that, since open slander 

 is obviously opposed to the interests of society, 

 injustice of thought, which is silent slander, must 

 become inextricably associated with the same 

 blame. 



But, granting the utility to society of all kinds 

 of benevolence and justice, why should the 

 quality of those virtues involve the sense of moral 

 obligation? 



Hume answers this question in the fifth section 

 entitled, "Why Utility Pleases/' He repudiates 

 the deduction of moral approbation from self-love, 



