xi THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS 237 



and utterly denies that we approve of benevolent 

 or just actions because we think of the benefits 

 which they are likely to confer indirectly on our- 

 selves. The source of the approbation with which 

 we view an act useful to society must be sought 

 elsewhere; and, in fact, is to be found in that feel- 

 ing which is called sympathy. 



" No man is absolutely indifferent to the happiness and 

 misery of others. The first has a natural tendency to give 

 pleasure, the second pain. This every one may find in him- 

 self. It is not probable that these principles can be resolved 

 into principles more simple and universal, whatever at- 

 tempts may have been made for that purpose." (IV. p. 294, 

 Note.} 



Other men's joys and sorrows are not spectacles 

 at which we remain unmoved: 



"... The view of the former, whether in its causes or 

 effects, like sunshine, or the prospect of well-cultivated plains 

 (to carry our pretensions no higher) communicates a secret 

 joy and satisfaction ; the appearance of the latter, like a 

 lowering cloud or barren landscape, throws a melancholy 

 damp over the imagination. And this concession being 

 once made, the difficulty is over; and a natural unforced 

 interpretation of the phenomena of human life will after- 

 wards, we hope, prevail among all speculative inquirers." 

 (IV. p. 320.) 



The moral approbation, therefore, with which 

 we regard acts of justice or benevolence rests upon 

 their utility to society, because the perception of 

 that utility or, in other words, of the pleasure 

 which they give to other men, arouses a feeling of 

 sympathetic pleasure in ourselves. The feeling of 

 obligation to be just, or of the duty of justice, 



