238 HUME xi 



arises out of that association of moral approbation 

 or disapprobation with one's own actions, which is 

 what we call conscience. To fail in justice, or in 

 benevolence, is to be displeased with one's self. 

 But happiness is impossible without inward self- 

 approval; and, hence, every man who has any 

 regard to his own happiness and welfare, will find 

 his best reward in the practice of every moral 

 duty. On this topic Hume expends much elo- 

 quence. 



" But what philosophical truths can be more advanta- 

 geous to society than these here delivered, which represent 

 virtue in all her genuine and most engaging charms, and 

 make us approach her with ease, familiarity, and affection? 

 The dismal dress falls off, with which many divines and 

 some philosophers have covered her ; and nothing appears 

 but gentleness, humanity, beneficence, affability ; nay, even 

 at proper intervals, play, frolic, and gaiety. She talks not 

 of useless austerities and rigours, suffering and self-denial. 

 She declares that her sole purpose is to make her votaries, 

 and all mankind, during every period of their existence, if 

 possible, cheerful, and happy ; nor does she ever willingly 

 part with any pleasure but in hopes of ample compensation 

 in some other period of their lives. The sole trouble which 

 she demands is that of just calculation, and a steady prefer- 

 ence of the greater happiness. And if any austere pretend- 

 ers approach her, enemies to joy and pleasure, she either re- 

 jects them as hypocrites and deceivers, or if she admit them 

 in her train, they are ranked, however, among the least 

 favoured of her votaries. 



"And, indeed, to drop all figurative expression, what 

 hopes can we ever have of engaging mankind to a practice 

 which we confess full of austerity and rigour ? Or what 

 theory of morals can ever serve any useful purpose, unless 

 it can show, by a particular detail, that all the duties which 



