THE METAPHYSICS OF SENSATION 257 



called real qualities, because they really exist in those bodies ; 

 but light, heat, whiteness, or coldness, are no more really in 

 them than sickness, or pain, is in manna. Take away the 

 sensation of them ; let not the eyes see light or colours, nor 

 the ears hear sounds ; let the palate not taste, nor the nose 

 smell ; and all colours, tastes, odours and sounds, as they 

 are such particular ideas, vanish and cease, and are reduced 

 to their causes, i. e. bulk, figure, and motion of parts. 



" 18. A piece of manna of sensible bulk is able to pro- 

 duce in us the idea of a round or square figure ; and, by 

 being removed from one place to another, the idea of motion. 

 This idea of motion represents it as it really is in the manna 

 moving ; a circle and square are the same, whether in idea 

 or existence, in the mind or in the manna ; and thus both 

 motion and figure are really in the manna, whether we take 

 notice of them or no : this everybody is ready to agree to."* 



So far as primary qualities are concerned, then, 

 Locke is as thoroughgoing a realist as St. Anselm. 

 In Berkeley, on the other hand, we have as com- 

 plete a representative of the nominalists and 

 conceptual! sts an intellectual descendant of 

 Eoscellinus and of Abelard. And by a curious 

 irony of fate, it is the nominalist who is, this 

 time, the champion of orthodoxy, and the realist 

 that of heresy. 



Once more let us try to work out Berkeley's 

 principles for ourselves, and inquire what founda- 

 tion there is for the assertion that extension, form, 

 solidity, and the other " primary qualities/' have 

 an existence apart from mind. And for this pur- 

 pose let us recur to our experiment with the pin. 



* See note B. 



