262 THE METAPHYSICS OF SENSATION 



the contact of bodies with the sensory surface of 

 the palm. But it does not appear that such a 

 person could arrive at any conception of geomet- 

 rical solidity. For that which does not come in 

 contact with the sensory surface is non-existent 

 for the sense of touch; and a solid body, impressed 

 upon the palm of the hand, gives rise only to the 

 notion of the extension of that particular 

 part of the solid which is in contact with the 

 skin. 



Nor is it possible that the idea of outness (in 

 the sense of discontinuity with the sentient body) 

 could be attained by such a person; for, as we 

 have seen, every tactile sensation is referred to a 

 point either of the natural sensory surface itself, 

 or of some solid in continuity with that surface. 

 Hence it would appear that the conception of the 

 difference between the Ego and the non-Ego could 

 not be attained by a man thus situated. His 

 feelings would be his universe, and his tactile 

 sensations his "mcenia mundi." Time would 

 exist for him as for us, but space would have only 

 two dimensions. 



But now remove the paralysis from the motor 

 apparatus, and give the palm of the hand of our 

 imaginary man perfect freedom to move, so as to 

 be able to glide in all directions over the bodies 

 with which it is in contact. Then with the con- 

 sciousness of that mobility, the notion of space of 

 three dimensions which is " Raum" or " room " 



