THE METAPHYSICS OP SENSATION 267 



same names ; nor is there any such thing as an idea or kind 

 of idea common to both senses." 



It will be observed that this proposition ex- 

 pressly declares that extension, figure, and motion, 

 and consequently distance, are immediately per- 

 ceived by sight as well as by touch; but that 

 visual distance, extension, figure, and motion, are 

 totally different in quality from the ideas of the 

 same name obtained through the sense of touch. 

 And other passages leave no doubt that such was 

 Berkeley's meaning. Thus in the 112th section 

 of the same Essay, he carefully defines the two 

 kinds of distance, one visual, the other tangible: 



" By the distance between any two points nothing more 

 is meant than the number of intermediate points. If the 

 given points are visible, the distance between them is 

 marked out by the number of interjacent visible points ; if 

 they are tangible, the distance between them is a line con- 

 sisting of tangible points." 



Again, there are two sorts of magnitude or ex- 

 tension: 



" It has been shown that there are two sorts of objects 

 apprehended by sight, each whereof has its distinct magni- 

 tude or extension : the one properly tangible, i. e., to be 

 perceived and measured by touch, and not immediately 

 falling under the sense of seeing ; the other properly and 

 immediately visible, by mediation of which the former is 

 brought into view." 55. 



But how are we to reconcile these passages with 

 others which will be perfectly familiar to every 



