272 THE METAPHYSICS OF SENSATION 



7. The sense of sight does not give rise to the 

 idea of mechanical solidity. 



8. There is no likeness whatever between the 

 tactile ideas called extension, figure,, magnitude, 

 and motion, and the visual ideas which go by the 

 same names; nor are any ideas common to the two 

 senses. 



9. When we think we see objects at a distance, 

 what really happens is that the visual picture 

 suggests that the object seen has tangible distance; 

 we confound the strong belief in the tangible dis- 

 tance of the object with actual sight of its distance. 



10. Visual ideas, therefore, constitute a kind of 

 language, by which we are informed of the tactile 

 ideas which will, or may, arise in us. 



Taking these propositions into consideration 

 seriatim, it may be assumed that every one will 

 assent to the first and second; and that for the 

 third and fourth we have only to include the 

 muscular sense under the name of sense of touch, 

 as Berkeley did, in order to make it quite accurate. 

 Nor is it intelligible to me that any one should 

 explicitly deny the truth of the fifth proposition, 

 though some of Berkeley's supporters, less careful 

 than himself, have done so. Indeed, it must be 

 confessed that it is only grudgingly, and as it were 

 against his will, that Berkeley admits that we 

 obtain ideas of extension, figure, and magnitude 

 by pure vision, and that he more than half re- 

 tracts the admission; while he absolutely denies 



