282 THE METAPHYSICS OF SENSATION 



eoveries when it would pry into the nature and 

 hidden causes of these ideas." 



Now, from this proposition, the thorough ma- 

 terialists dissent as much, on the one hand, as 

 Berkeley does, upon the other hand. 



The thorough materialist asserts that there is a 

 something which he calls the " substance " of mat- 

 ter; that this something is the cause of all phe- 

 nomena, whether material or mental; that it is 

 self-existent and eternal, and so forth. 



Berkeley, on the contrary, asserts, with equal 

 confidence, that there is no substance of matter, 

 but only a substance of mind, which he terms 

 spirit; that there are two kinds of spiritual sub- 

 stance, the one eternal and uncreated, the sub- 

 stance of the Deity, the other created, and, once 

 created, naturally eternal; that the universe, as 

 known to created spirits, has no being in itself, 

 but is the result of the action of the substance of 

 the Deity on the substance of those spirits. 



In contradiction to which bold assertion, Locke 

 affirms that we simply know nothing about sub- 

 stance of any kind.* 



" So that if any one will examine himself concerning his 

 notion of pure substance in general, he will find he has no 

 other idea of it at all, but only a supposition of he knows 



* Berkeley virtually makes the same confession of igno- 

 rance, when he admits that we can have no idea or notion of a 

 spirit (Principles of Human Knowledge. 138) ; and the way 

 in which he tries to escape the consequences of this admission, 

 is a splendid example of the floundering of a mired logician. 



