THE METAPHYSICS OF SENSATION 287 



Little as we have, even yet, learned of the material universe, 

 that little makes for the belief that it is a system of unbroken 

 order and perfect symmetry, of which the form incessantly 

 changes, while the substance and the energy are imperishable. 



It will be understood that those who are thoroughly im- 

 bued with this view of what is called " matter " find it a little 

 difficult to understand why that which is termed "mind" 

 should give itself such airs of superiority over the twin sis- 

 ter ; to whom, so far as our planet is concerned, it might be 

 hazardous to deny the right of primogeniture. 



Accepting the ordinary view of mind, it is a substance 

 the properties of which are states of consciousness, on the one 

 hand, and energy of the same order as that of the material 

 world (or else it would not be able to affect the latter) on 

 the other hand. It is admitted that chance has no more place 

 in the world of mind, than it has in that of matter. Sensa- 

 tions, emotions, intellections are subject to an order, as strict 

 and inviolable as that which obtains among material things. 

 If the order which obtains in the material world lays it open 

 to the reproach of subjection to " blind necessity," the de- 

 monstrable existence of a similar order amidst the phenom- 

 ena of consciousness (and without the belief in that fixed 

 order, logic has no binding force and morals have no founda- 

 tion) renders it obnoxious to the same condemnation. For 

 necessity is necessity, and whether it is blind or sharp-eyed 

 is nothing to the purpose. 



Even if the supposed energy of the substance of mind is 

 sometimes exerted without any antecedent cause which is 

 the only intelligible sense of the popular doctrine of free-will 

 the occurrence is admittedly exceptional, and, by the na- 

 ture of the case, it is not susceptible of proof. Moreover, if 

 the hypothetical substance of mind is possessed of energy, I, 

 for my part, am unable to see how it is to be discriminated 

 from the hypothetical substance of matter. 



Thus, if any man think he has reason to believe that the 

 " substance " of matter, to the existence of which no limit 

 can be set r ither in time or space, is the infinite and eternal 



