36 EVOLUTION AND ETHICS. i 



every member of the society in the possession of 

 the means of existence, the struggle for existence, 

 as between man and man, within that society is, 

 ipso facto, at an end. And, as it is undeniable 

 that the most highly civilized societies have sub- 

 stantially reached this position, it follows that, so 

 far as they are concerned, the struggle for exist- 

 ence can play no important part within them.* 

 In other words, the kind of evolution which is 

 brought about in the state of nature cannot take 

 place. 



I have further shown cause for the belief that 

 direct selection, after the fashion of the horticul- 

 turist and the breeder, neither has played, nor 

 can play, any important part in the evolution 

 of society; apart from other reasons, because I 

 do not see how such selection could be practised 

 without a serious weakening, it may be the de- 

 struction, of the bonds which hold society together. 

 It strikes me that men who are accustomed to 

 contemplate the active or passive extirpation of 

 the weak, the unfortunate, and the superfluous; 

 who justify that conduct on the ground that it has 

 the sanction of the cosmic process, and is the only 

 way of ensuring the progress of the race; who, if 



* Whether the struggle for existence with the state of 

 nature and with other societies, so far as they stand in 

 the relation of the state of nature with it, exerts a se- 

 lective influence upon modern society, and in what direc- 

 tion, are questions not easy to answer. The problem of 

 the effect of military and industrial warfare upon those 

 who wage it is very complicated. 



