132 SCIENCE AND MORALS. m 



nitz or of Newton.* To me the " chimaera, bom- 

 binans in vacuo quia comedit secundus inten- 

 tiones " of the schoolmen is a familiar and do- 

 mestic creature compared with such "forces." 

 Besides, by the hypothesis, the forces are not mat- 

 ter; and thus all that is of any particular conse- 

 quence in the world turns out to be not matter 

 on the Materialist's own showing. Let it not be 

 supposed that I am casting a doubt upon the pro- 

 priety of the employment of the terms " atom " 

 and " force/' as they stand among the working 

 hypotheses of physical science. As formulae which 

 can be applied, with perfect precision and great 

 convenience, in the interpretation of nature, their 

 value is incalculable; but, as real entities, having 

 an objective existence, an indivisible particle which 

 nevertheless occupies space is surely inconceiv- 

 able; and with respect to the operation of that 

 atom, where it is not, by the aid of a " force " 

 resident in nothingness, I am as little able to im- 

 agine it as I fancy any one else is. 



Unless and until anybody will resolve all these 

 doubts and difficulties for me, I think I have a 

 right to hold aloof from Materialism. As to 



* See the famous Collection of Papers, published by 

 Clarke in 1717. Leibnitz says: " 'Tis also a supernatural 

 thing that bodies should attract one another at a dis- 

 tance without any intermediate means." Arid Clarke, on 

 behalf of Newton, caps this as follows: "That one body 

 should attract another without any intermediate means 

 is, indeed, not a miracle, but a contradiction; for 'tis 

 supposing something to act where it is not." 



