J2 6 PHYSICS OF MIND. 



as an object to be pitied, and his work either ignored or 

 treated with undisguised scorn. 



And yet of all teachers should not those who teach 

 philosophy do their very utmost to encourage a thorough 

 examination of the grounds upon which conclusions are 

 based, and ought not such among us, to specially favour free 

 discussion ? They write ostensibly to exercise the reasoning 

 power of their readers. Sensitiveness of hostile criticism, a 

 weak fondness for unproved theories, ought to be exhibited 

 least of all by those who take the proud title of philosophers. 



Not a few thoughtful persons who accept the physical 

 views of mind have deceived themselves so as at last to 

 believe in the truth of the so-called scientific facts upon 

 which some very startling conclusions concerning the physics 

 of mind have been supposed to rest. In short, some who 

 have written upon the philosophic aspect of physical science 

 find themselves in this position. Fully alive to the import- 

 ance of the bearing of facts of physiology and natural history 

 upon many of the philosophic questions they are called upon 

 to discuss, they evidently feel incompetent to investigate for 

 themselves the facts they desire to use, and are unable to 

 test them by personal investigation. Eminently competent 

 as they may be to write on logic and philosophy, they are 

 obliged to take their physiology second-hand, and, as would 

 be supposed, from not being familiar with the subject, 

 exhibit little judgment in the selection of the scientific 

 authority they determine to follow. It is not difficult to 

 find scientific statements, which have been accepted even 

 by Mr. J. S. Mill, Mr. Herbert Spencer, and Mr. Bain, that 

 have been reasoned upon as if indeed these statements had 

 referred to incontrovertible facts of science. In truth, these 



