SELECTION OF FACTS. 127 



great authorities have fallen into the curious error of accept- 

 ing as facts of observation and experiment mere assertions 

 and expressions of opinion, on the part of scientific men, 

 whose views they, strange to say, adopt without suspicion 

 and without enquiry. It is surprising in these days of 

 knowledge, of fact, and of law, that inferences of grave im- 

 portance, intended to form the ground-work of a complete 

 system of philosophy for the guidance of the youth of the 

 future, should have been grounded upon fictions of the 

 imagination, or even upon fanciful data of some popular 

 writers enthusiastic about the discovery of new facts in phy- 

 siology and natural history by a process more ready and 

 direct than that known to those who have considered it 

 a duty to rely upon the more ancient method of fact 

 discovery by the tedious and uncertain means of observa- 

 tion and experiment. 



On the other hand, not a few scientific men, looking 

 with favour upon certain new philosophic generalizations, 

 have drawn attention exclusively to those particular facts 

 which afford support to the conclusions they desired 

 should be accepted. It is not difficult to find instances in 

 which, from multitudes of facts, of which a number seemed 

 to point to one conclusion, and many to a very different con- 

 clusion, those only have been selected which seemed to 

 afford support to a favourite doctrine. Facts telling in other 

 directions, and their bearing have been completely ignored, 

 just as if they did not exist, and could not have been taken 

 into account. Out of such a storehouse of facts as nature 

 provides, it is always possible to select some which will 

 support almost any theory that may be suggested upon 

 questions of natural knowledge. And in cases where fact 



