158 SENTIENCE AND CONSCIOUSNESS 



gible chaos of sense, throw all into the unknown, and 

 dwell in a dogmatism, an obscurantism, and an intolerance 

 peculiar to themselves."* There is, I venture to think 

 much to justify him in the opinion he has been led to 

 form. Few, probably, at this time will agree with him or 

 with me, but I much wish that those who are so very con- 

 fident as to the truth of their views upon these matters 

 would condescend to explain first principles, and tell us in 

 simple language how the most elementary nerve organs we 

 know of perform their work. What happens, for instance, 

 to a nerve when an "impression" is made upon it, and 

 what is the exact difference in its state just before it 

 received an impression, at the moment it is impressed, 

 and just afterwards ? Are these questions too " frivolous " 

 for philosophers to consider? The discussion of such 

 simple matters would probably help us in discovering 

 exactly what we really know at this time concerning 

 " sensation." 



In an interesting paper recently written by Mr. Snow, 

 I find many arguments bearing upon some of the questions 

 discussed in the present section of this book, with the 

 general tenor of which I cordially agree, though I venture to 

 think that in some places the author pushes his conclusions 

 much further than he need have done, and beyond the 

 necessities of the case.t He has, as it seems to me, been 

 led to confuse vital actions, universally characteristic of all 

 life, with the highest vital manifestations peculiar to some 

 kinds of life, and thus I think he has fallen into the mistake 

 of contending for the identity of the lowest with the highest 



* "Fortnightly Review," October 1st, 1872, p. 437. 

 f "Contemporary Review," March, 1873, p. 573. 



