PROXIMATE DEFINITION OF LIFE. ^7 



I think, admit its bias and philosophical unfairness. Redis- 

 tribution of matter, Redistribution of motion, Actions 

 and reactions, Direct reactions and indirect reactions, 

 Molecular vibrations, Aggregations and collocations, are 

 the philosophical anaesthetics employed to put the reader's 

 mind to sleep for awhile, and bring about that state of in- 

 tellectual fog during which attendant circumstances are 

 sure to be accepted as efficient causes, and a simple con- 

 dition expanded into a full and " obvious explanation " of 

 a highly complex result. 



" The redistribution of matter and motion constitutes 

 evolution," and living bodies are built of compounds that 

 are instrumental to vital actions. The lifeless strikes the 

 keys of the instrument, and evolves the living harmonies. 

 The lifeless is all important, the instrument that lives a 

 creation of the imagination ! Philosophy can take no cogni- 

 zance of it, or of the fiction called by some its life. 



But it would perhaps be difficult to give a more complete 

 illustration of the defects of Mr. Herbert Spencer's method 

 than is afforded by the greater part of his chapter "On the 

 Proximate definition of Life," and I commend this chapter 

 to the careful attention of the active minds now training in 

 our Universities, and venture to suggest that it will be found 

 well worthy of most careful analysis. Mr. Herbert Spencer 

 admits that his definition contains something that is " in- 

 dispensable" to the argument developed in his Principles of 

 Psychology, and it must be clear to every one who reflects 

 upon the matter that the question of the nature of " Life " 

 underlies the question concerning the nature of mind. He 

 who attempted to determine what thought was before he 

 had determined what life was, and how the apparatus by 



