15 



structure, might of themselves be held sufficient to raise 

 serious doubts about the sensibility of insects, or at least 

 any considerable degree of it, we are disposed to insist 

 more particularly on the above views respecting sensation 

 itself, which consider it as not entirely an organic, any 

 more than entirely a mental operation. Into sensation, 

 mind as well as body must enter. We entirely adopt the 

 opinion of the encyclopediste, that " the highest exer- 

 cise of the intellectual faculties is not more incom- 

 patible with our conception of matter only, than the 

 simplest sensation ; and that there is infinitely greater 

 distance between the most refined etherialised matter, 

 however organised, and the lowest perception, than be- 

 twixt perception in its simplest form and the most reflec- 

 tive of the acts of intelligence."* 



It is evident that the mind being strictly incorporeal, 

 and not liable to the demands of the body, or susceptible 

 of the injuries of the body, cannot be the proper seat of 

 pain. Nevertheless, the discussion of sensation, or sen- 

 sibility, necessarily introduces the uncorporeal part of 

 our nature; because sensation involves perception, and 

 perception supposes consciousness. On the other hand, 

 the mind can only perceive what the sense has first duly 

 brought under its cognizance ; a smell to be recognised 

 and distingnished, as of musk, or acetic acid, of assa- 

 fetida, or a rose, must have been transmitted from the 

 corporeal organ to the incorporeal sensory, and nothing 

 can be seen by the mind's eye which has not been origi- 

 nally transmitted by the nerve of vision through the optic 

 apparatus. 



Sensation, it appears then is, strictly, neither an affec- 

 tion of the mind, nor, exclusively, of the organ, but results 

 from the combined action of the two perhaps of the mind 

 most ; for that sensation is really more a mental pheno- 



*Art. Instinct, Encyclopedic. 



