wtfrms, in virtue of the ganglionic life of each, and yet 

 capable of consolidation into one existence ? To support 

 this theory it will not be enough that each ganglionic cen- 

 tre, whatever cerebral attributes we shall invest it 

 with, be supposed in possession of its own indepen- 

 dence ; for as the worm entire can move his whole body 

 thus composed, we must further suppose an exact har- 

 mony and understanding between these different indivi- 

 dualities, else his actions would have no unity, no rythm, 

 no steadiness of purpose, or uniformity of character. In 

 short, has a worm a will, or a chorus of wills ? To will 

 is one of the first attributes of mind, (and mind is unity, 

 is indivisible,) as opposed to matter, or to mechanical 

 necessity. When I walk, I will to walk /have but one 

 brain when a worm crawls, with his twenty brains, is it 

 his will or their wills that govern him ? Were every 

 ganglion a separate brain, there might come to be, there 

 is no denying it, an insurrection or mutiny of the wills, the 

 balance of power in the ganglionic Republic might be per- 

 petually disturbed, and not only every motion be very dif- 

 ficult to be executed, but even the vital principle be often 

 in exceeding doubt how to distribute itself/ Neither then 



* If any one shall say that I am perplexing what is extremely 

 simple, and that no one pretends that these ganglionic brains are 

 like our brains, seats of intelligence, but simply depots of sensibility, 

 (and there is no third office that can be suggested), I reply, that 

 a plurality, even of such brains, cannot be supposed in the same in- 

 dividual bird, beast, reptile, or insect. To enter fully upon the 

 subject would be to anticipate in a great measure what follows in 

 the text; I would merely state here, that as there can be no feeling 

 without consciousness (for I ask whether any one can conceive of 

 feeling separately from consciousness; and whether the words " I 

 am conscious of a pain or uneasiness" are not synonymous with 

 " I feel pain or uneasiness ?") and consciousness is essentially single 

 like all the other phenomena having reference to mind, which is 

 one and single so there can be but one seat for consciousness, or 

 for feeling, i. e., one brain. 



That there can be but one brain may be also proved by a compari- 

 son of the phrase, / feel, with that of, / digest, I breathe; or with any 

 other function of organic life. We are conscious that our mind, our 

 inner man, our "I," is involved in the first expression ; and that 



