INTRODUCTORY 2J 



Some, who so far agree with Plato, may be led to remind Berke- 

 ley that objects of sense are not only first considered by all men, but 

 most considered by most men ; and that the possession of opinions 

 may be no evidence of reason. 



Truth, he tells us, is the cry of all, but the game of few ; and 

 while there may be wisdom in a multitude of counsellors, Huxley 

 reminds us that it is in but one or two of them. 



Some may assert that, admitting that we have no sense-organ 

 by which we perceive the relation between a pattering sound on 

 the roof and a shower, the connection between the sound of rain 

 and the falling drops is nevertheless physical and not mental ; 

 and that response to the order of nature is no evidence of reason, 

 since we do not attribute judgment to the mimosa, which, stimu- 

 lated by the falling drops, folds its leaves that the rain may reach 

 its roots. 



They may also assert that, if the structure and history of all 

 parts of our own organic mechanism were fully known, we should 

 be able to show that the principles of science are physical ; that 

 we apprehend them because our minds are the ones which have 

 survived the struggle for existence ; and that these principles are 

 no more than natural selection would lead one to expect ; although 

 we must ask whether we find in nature any reason why what 

 we expect must happen ; whether natural selection is an efficient 

 cause, or only a generalization from experience ; and whether 

 experience is not itself a state of mind. We may point out that 

 hope is not science, and that no one has, as yet, deduced the 

 principles of science from brain anatomy ; and we may ask whether, 

 if this were accomplished, the anatomical structure of the brain, 

 and of the other organs which we study by our senses, is not a 

 thing perceived ; whether perception is not mental ; and whether 

 a thing perceived by sense is not a phenomenon of mind. We 

 may also ask whether proof that our organ of common sense has 

 come about, like our eyes and ears, by the survival of the fittest^ 

 would tell us any more about the relation between mind and 

 matter than our eyes and ears tell us now. 



I am not able to answer the question whether, in ultimate 

 analysis, the principles of science are physical or metaphysical. 

 I know nothing about things ultimate. I do not know what the 



