MIGRATION IN ITS BEARING ON LAMARCKISM 1 19 



real; for while I am convinced that the moral sense owes its 

 existence to its utility, I fail to see what bearing its history has 

 on its significance or its value. 



They who perceive that all the nature of living things is prima- 

 rily for the good of others, and that the poison of serpents and 

 the ferocity of the tiger are as free from selfishness as the industry 

 of the bee or the mother's love for her child, can no longer wonder 

 if something in our own nature should impel us to acts which 

 are not to our personal liking or advantage ; nor need they fear 

 lest the discovery of the natural history of the moral sense may 

 destroy its value. 



Should it not rather " seem to follow that reasonable creatures 

 were, as the philosophical Emperor observes, made one for another ; 

 and, consequently, that man ought not to consider himself as an 

 independent individual, whose happiness is not connected with that 

 of. other men ; but rather as a part of a whole, to the common 

 good of which he ought to conspire, and order his ways and 

 actions suitably, if he would live according to nature " ? " Will it 

 not follow that a wise man should consider and pursue his private 

 good, with regard to, and in conjunction with, that of other men ? 

 though, indeed, the sympathy of pain and pleasure, and the 

 mutual affections by which mankind are knit together, have been 

 always allowed a plain proof of this point; and though it was 

 the constant doctrine of those who were esteemed the wisest and 

 most thinking men among the ancients."^ 



1 Berkeley, "Alciphron," I. 16 and II. 13. 



