LOUIS AGASSIZ AND GEORGE BERKELEY 325 



after giving, in the second dialogue between Hylas and Philonous, 

 his reasons for believing that " the Supreme, unlimited Agent useth 

 no tool or instrument at all," and after pointing out that we 

 cannot "suppose that an all-perfect Spirit should need an instru- 

 ment, or, not needing it, make use of it," he tells us in " Siris," 

 (151-161) that "the mind presiding in the world" does use instru- 

 ments, and that the fitness of nature for the needs of man is 

 evidence of contrivance, or the use of means for the attainment 

 of ends ; for he holds that the mechanism of nature is " necessary 

 to assist the governed " ; and he tells us it is maintained /;/ order 

 that intelligent beings may exist, although one must ask whether 

 proof that nature is useful is proof that it is necessary. 



" Without a regular course," says Berkeley, " nature could never 

 be understood ; mankind must be always at a loss, not knowing 

 what to expect, or how to govern themselves, or direct their actions 

 for the obtaining of any end." As a matter of fact, we do have 

 practical confidence in the stability of the order of nature, and 

 we do not find ourselves at a loss except through ignorance, al- 

 though we do not know whether we shall be alive an hour hence. 

 We know what we expect, although nothing is more certain than 

 that we never know whether what we expect will happen. We 

 do govern ourselves, and we have, in the past, been able to direct 

 our actions for the attainment of ends, so that on the whole our 

 ends have been attained when we have made no mistakes ; for 

 whether the mechanism of nature is necessary or not, our confi- 

 dence in its stability has not, so far, disappointed any expectations 

 that were reasonable and well founded. 



It is not even necessary that we should know the value of re- 

 sponse to the order of nature in order to bring about beneficial 

 ends, for many of our most important responses take place in 

 unconsciousness. The value of our circulation did not begin with 

 Harvey; nor need one know anything about the chemistry of 

 respiration or nutrition in order to profit by it. 



" Unconscious activity," says Holmes, " is the rule with the 

 actions most important to life. The lout who lies stretched on 

 the tavern-bench, with just mental activity enough to keep his 

 pipe from going out, is the unconscious tenant of a laboratory 

 where such combinations are constantlv being made as never Wohlcr 



