I 



PALEY, AND THE ARGUMENT FROM CONTRIVANCE 279 



plished by methods which are rigorously scientific ; and no scien- 

 tific generalization, not even natural selection itself, has more 

 profound significance than the great natural law which modern stu- 

 dents have built upon his foundation ; for we now know that there 

 is no break in the continuity of life, and that every living thing 

 with which we are acquainted is in direct unbroken vital continu- 

 ity with the primeval living matter of pre-Cambrian times. 



This being the case, is it not plain that, so far as the ques- 

 tion of origin is concerned, we know only a single example of 

 life ? Our knowledge is, in this respect, a single experience ; and it 

 affords no basis for comparison with any other aspect of nature, 

 or for scientific generalization, or for any other logical process, 

 either positive or negative. 



So far as I can see, there is no reason why we should not say 

 now as Huxley said before natural selection was discovered : " It may 

 be that, by and by, philosophers will discover some higher laws of 

 which the facts of life are particular cases, — very possibly they 

 will find out some bond between physico-chemical phenomena on 

 the one hand and vital phenomena on the other. At present we 

 assuredly know of none ; and I think we shall exercise a wise 

 humility in confessing that, for us at least, . . . this distinction be- 

 tween living bodies and those which do not live is an ultimate fact." 



If any choose to believe life is different from matter and 

 motion, I do not see how, in the present state of our knowledge, 

 they can be proved wrong; nor can we in justice charge them 

 with belief in the supernatural, for the assertion that belief in that 

 which is not physical is belief in the supernatural is not reasoning 

 until every natural phenomenon has been proved to be physical; 

 neither is there any more reason in the assertion that the inde- 

 structibility of energy disproves spontaneity even if some form of 

 dead matter should be proved to respond to the order of nature 

 to its own advantage, like living things. 



On the other hand, it seems clear that we can give no reason 

 for disagreeing with those who believe life is a property of proto- 

 plasm except that this is not yet proved. Our inability to con- 

 ceive that a thought or a response can be a property of matter 

 is no reason why this may not be true. So far as I can discover, 

 the only reason why we are able to conceive that weight can be 



