THE BELFAST ADDRESS. 143 



tible, and into them all things can be resolved at last. 

 Bodies are partly atoms and partly combinations of 

 atoms; but the atoms nothing can quench. They are 

 strong in solid singleness, and, by their denser com- 

 bination, all things can be closely packed and exhibit 

 enduring strength. He denies that matter is infinitely 

 divisible. We come at length to the atoms, without 

 which, as an imperishable substratum, all order in the 

 generation and development of things would be de- 

 stroyed. 



The mechanical shock of the atoms being, in his 

 view, the all-sufficient cause of things, he combats the 

 notion that the constitution of nature has been in any 

 way determined by intelligent design. The interac- 

 tion of the atoms throughout infinite time rendered all 

 manner of combinations possible. Of these, the fit 

 ones persisted, while the unfit ones disappeared. Not 

 after sage deliberation did the atoms station them- 

 selves in their right places, nor did they bargain what 

 motions they should assume. From all eternity they 

 have been driven together, and, after trying motions 

 and unions of every kind, they fell at length into the 

 arrangements out of which this system of things has 

 been evolved. 'If you will apprehend and keep in 

 mind these things, Nature, free at once, and rid of her 

 haughty lords, is seen to do all things spontaneously 

 of herself, without the meddling of the gods/* 



To meet the objection that his atoms cannot be 

 seen, Lucretius describes a violent storm, and shows 

 that the invisible particles of air act in the same way 

 as the visible particles of water. We perceive, more- 



* Monro's translation. In his criticism of this work ('Con- 

 temporary Review,' 1867) Dr. Hayman does not appear to be 

 aware of the really sound and subtile observations on which the 

 reasoning of Lucretius, though erroneous, sometimes rests. 



