THE BELFAST ADDRESS. 187 



to the same depth or to the same relief, and indis- 

 solubly connected. And here we come to the threshold 

 of a great question. Seeing that he could in no way 

 rid himself of the consciousness of Space and Time, 

 Kant assumed them to be necessary ' forms of intui- 

 tion/ the moulds and shapes into which our intuitions 

 are thrown, belonging to ourselves, and without objec- 

 tive existence. With unexpected power and success, 

 Mr. Spencer brings the hereditary experience theory, 

 as he holds it, to bear upon this question. ' If there 

 exist certain external relations which are experienced 

 by all organisms at all instants of their waking lives 

 relations which are absolutely constant and universal 

 there will be established answering internal relations, 

 that are absolutely constant and universal. Such rela- 

 tions we have in those of Space and Time. As the 

 substratum of all other relations of the Non-Ego, they 

 must be responded to by conceptions that are the sub- 

 strata of all other relations in the Ego. Being the 

 constant and infinitely repeated elements of thought, 

 they must become the automatic elements of thought- 

 the elements of thought which it is impossible to get 

 rid of the " forms of intuition." ' 



Throughout this application and extension of 

 Hartley's and Mill's ' Law of Inseparable Association/ 

 Mr. Spencer stands upon his own ground, invoking, 

 instead of the experiences of the individual, the regis- 

 tered experiences of the race. His overthrow of the 

 restriction of experience to the individual is, I think, 

 complete. That restriction ignores the power of or- 

 ganising experience, furnished at the outset to each 

 individual; it ignores the different degrees of this 

 power possessed by different races, and by different 

 individuals of the same race. Were there not in the 

 human brain a potency antecedent to all experience, 

 42 



