SCIENCE AND MAN. 363 



determine our actions in what sense can these actions 

 be said to be the result of free-will? 



Here, again, we are confronted with the question of 

 moral responsibility, which, as it has been much talked 

 of lately, it is desirable to meet. With the view of re- 

 moving the fear of our falling back into the condition 

 of ' the ape and tiger/ so sedulously excited by certain 

 writers, I propose to grapple with this question in its 

 rudest form, and in the most uncompromising way. 

 ' If,' says the robber, the ravisher, or the murderer, * I 

 act because I must act, what right have you to hold 

 me responsible for my deeds?' The reply is, ' The 

 right of society to protect itself against aggressive and 

 injurious forces, whether they be bond or free, forces of 

 nature or forces of man.' ' Then,' retorts the criminal, 

 ' you punish me for what I cannot help.' ( Let it be 

 granted,' says society, ' but had you known that the 

 treadmill or the gallows was certainly in store for you, 

 you might have " helped." Let us reason the matter 

 fully and frankly out. We may entertain no malice or 

 hatred against you; it is enough that with a view to 

 our own safety and purification we are determined that 

 you and such as you shall not enjoy liberty of evil action 

 in our midst. You, who have behaved as a wild beast, 

 we claim the right to cage or kill as we should a wild 

 beast. The public safety is a matter of more impor- 

 tance than the very limited chance of your moral reno- 

 vation, while the knowledge that you have been hanged 

 by the neck may furnish to others about to do as you 

 have done the precise motive which will hold them 

 back. If your act be such as to invoke a minor penalty, 

 then not only others, but yourself, may profit by the 

 punishment which we inflict. On the homely principle 

 that " a burnt child dreads the fire," it will make you 

 53 



