LOGIC OF RECEPTS. 47 



far as these are operations of an orderly kind. For in so far 

 as they are orderly or adaptive — and not merely sentient or 

 indifferent — such operations all consist, as we have just seen, 

 in processes of ideal grouping, or binding together* And 

 therefore I see no impropriety in using the word Logic for the 

 special purpose of emphasizing the fundamental identity of all 

 ideation — so far, that is, as its method is concerned, I object, 

 however, to the terms " Logic of Feelings " and " Logic of 

 Signs." For, on the one hand, "Feelings," have to do primarily 

 with the sentient and emotional side of mental life, as dis- 

 tinguished from the intellectual or ideational. And, on the 

 other hand, " Signs " are the expressions of ideas ; not the ideas 

 themselves. Hence, whatever method, or meaning, they may 

 present is but a reflection of the order, or grouping, among 

 the ideas which they are used to express. The logic, there- 

 fore, is neither in the feelings nor in the signs ; but in the ideas. 

 On this account I have substituted for the above terms what 

 I take to be more accurate designations — namely, the Logic 

 of Recepts, and the Logic of Concepts.! 



In the present chapter we have only to consider the logic 

 of recepts, and, in order to do so efficiently, we may first of 

 all briefly note that even within the region of percepts we 

 meet with a process of spontaneous grouping of like with like, 

 which, in turn, leads us downwards to the purely unconscious 

 or mechanical grouping of stimuli in the lower nerve-centres. 

 So that, as fully argued out in my previous work, on its 

 objective face the method has everywhere been the same : 



* The word Logic is derived from \6yos, which in turn is derived from Klyw, to 

 arrange, to lay in order, to pick up, to bind together. 



t Tiie terms Logic of Feelings and Logic of Signs were first introduced and 

 extensively employed by Comte. Afterwards they were adopted, and still more 

 extensively employed by Lewes, who, however, seems to have thought that he so 

 employed them in some different sense. To me it appears that in this Lewes was 

 mistaken. Save that Comte is here, as elsewhere, intoxicated with theology, I 

 think that the ideas he intended to set forth under these terms are the same as 

 those which are advocated by Lewes — although his incohercncyjustifies the remark 

 of his follower : — " lieing unable to understand this, I do not criticize it " {/'robs, 

 of Life and Mind, iii., p. 239). The terms in question are also sanctioned by 

 Mill, as shown by the above quotation (p. 42). 



