64 MENTAL EVOLVTIOX IN MAN. 



remains a possibility that in the melting-pot some further 

 ingredient may have been added. Human intelligence is un- 

 doubtedly derived from human experience, in the same way 

 as animal intelligence is derived from animal experience ; but 

 this does not prove that the ideation which we have in 

 common with brutes is not supplemented by ideation of some 

 other order, or kind. Presently I shall consider the arguments 

 which are adduced to prove that it has been, and then it will 

 become apparent that the supplement, if any, must have been 

 added in the smelting-fire of Language — a fact, be it observed, 

 which is conceded by all modern writers who deny the genetic 

 continuity of mind in animal and human intelligence. Thus 

 far, then, I have attempted nothing more than a preliminary 

 clearing of the ground — first by carefully defining my terms 

 and impartially explaining the psychology of ideation ; next 

 by indicating the nature of the question which has presently 

 to be considered ; and, lastly, by showing the level to which 

 intelligence attains under the logic of recepts, without any 

 possibility of assistance from the logic of concepts. 



Only one other topic remains to be dealt with in the 

 present chapter. We continually find it assumed, and con- 

 fidently stated as if the statement did not admit of question, 

 that the simplest or most primitive order of ideation is that 

 which is concerned only with particulars, or with special objects 

 of perception. The nascent ideas of an infant are supposed to 

 crystallize around the nuclei furnished by individual percepts ; 

 the less intelligent animals — if not, indeed, animals in general 

 — are supposed, as Locke says, to deal " only in particular 

 ideas, just as they receive them from the senses." Now, I 

 fully assent to this, if it is only meant (as I understand Locke 

 to mean) that infants and animals are not able consciously, 

 intentionally, or, as he says, " of themselves, to compound and 

 make complex ideas." In order thus intentionally, or of 

 themselves, to compound their ideas, they would require to 

 tJiink about their ideas as ideas, or consciously to set one idea 

 before another as two distinct objects of thought, and for the 



