1 66 MENTAL EVOLUTION IX MAX. 



' images ' answering respectively to ' a thing being,' and ' a 

 thing not being,' and to 'at the same time' and 'in the same 

 sense;' but the images do not constitute the judgment itself, 

 any more than human 'swimming' is made up of limbs and 

 fluid, though without such necessary elements no such swim- 

 ming could take place.* 



" This distinction is also shown by the fact that one and 

 the same idea may be suggested to, and maintained in, the 

 mind by the help of the most incongruous images, and very 

 different ideas by the very same image ; this we may see to 

 be the case with such ideas as ' number,' ' purpose,' ' motion,' 

 ' identity,' &c. 



" But the distinctness of ' thought ' from ' imagination ' may 

 perhaps be made clearer by the drawing out fully wliat we 

 really do when we make some simple judgment, as, e.^., ' A 

 negro is black.' Here, in the first place, we directly and 

 explicitly affirm that there is a conformity between the 

 external thing, 'a negro,' and the external quality 'blackness' 

 • — the negro possessing that quality. We affirm, secondarily 

 and implicit!)', a conformity between two external entities and 

 two corresponding internal concepts. And thirdly, and lastly, 

 we also implicitly affirm the existence of a conformity between 

 the subjective judgment and the objective existence." t 



I will next allow this matter to be presented in the words 

 of another adversary, and one whom Mr. Mivart approvingly 

 quotes. 



"The question is. Can the sense say anything — make a 

 judgment at all? Can it furnish the blank formula of a 

 judgment — the ' is ' in ' A is B ' .? The grass of the battlefield 

 was green, and the sense gave both the grass and the green- 



* The "images answering respectively to 'a thing being,' and 'a thing not 

 being,' and to *at the same time' and 'in the same sense,'" must indeed be 

 "vague." How is it conceivable that " the imagination " can entertain any such 

 " images " at all, apart from the "abstract ideas " of the " mind " ? Such ideas 

 as "a thing not being," or " being in the same sense," &c., belong to the sphere 

 of conceptual thought, and cannot have any existence at all except as "abstract 

 ideas of the mind." 



t A^ature, August 21, 1879. 



