SFEECFT. 177 



need not now repeat. He begins by conveying the distinction 

 as it was stated by Bufifon, thus : — 



" Far from denying feelings to animals, I concede to them 

 everything except thought and reflection. . . . They have 

 sensations, but no faculty of comparing them with one 

 another, that is to say they have not the power which pro- 

 duces ideas " — i.e. products of reflection. Then, after alluding 

 to Bufton's views on the distinction between " automatic 

 memory" and "intellectual memory" {i.e. the distinction 

 which I have recognized in the Diagram attached to my 

 previous work by calling the former " memory" and the latter 

 " recollection "), Mr. Mivart adds : — " The distinction is one 

 quite easy to perceive. That we have automatic memor}', 

 such as animals have, is obvious : but the presence of 

 intellectual memory may be made evident by searching 

 our minds (so to speak) for something which we have 

 fully remembered before, and thus intellectually remember 

 to have known, though we cannot now bring it before the 

 imagination. And as with memory, so with other of our 

 mental powers, we may, I think, distinguish between a higher 

 and a lower faculty of each ; between our higher, self-con- 

 scious, reflective mental acts — the acts of our intellectual 

 faculty — and those of our merely sensitive power. This dis- 

 tinction I believe to be one of the most fundamental of all the 

 distinctions of biology, and to be one the apprehension of 

 which is a necessary preliminary to a successful investigation 

 of animal psychology." * 



Were it necessary, I could quote from his work, entitled 



Lessons from Nature, sundry further passages expressing 



the same distinction in other words ; but I have already been 



careful, even to redundancy, in presenting this distinction, not 



only because it is the distinction on which Mr. Mivart rests 



his whole argument for the separation of man from the rest 



of the animal kingdom as a being unique in kind ; but still 



more because it is, as he is careful to point out, the one real 



distinction which has hitherto always been drawn by philo- 



* Nature, August 21, 1879. 



N 



