SPEECH. 1 79 



may disregard the last of these distinctions, and consider the 

 denominative phase of language as psychologically identical 

 Avith the predicative. Similarly, we may now neglect the 

 indicative phase, as one which bears no relation to the matters 

 at present before us. Thus we have to fasten attention only 

 upon the differences between the denotative, the connotative, 

 and the denominative phases of language. This has already 

 been done in general terms ; but must now be done in more 

 detail. And for the sake of being clear, even at the risk of 

 being tedious, I will begin by repeating the important dis- 

 tinctions already explained. 



When a parrot calls a dog Boiv-zvozv (as a parrot, like a 

 child, may easily be taught to do), the parrot may be said, in 

 one sense of the word, to be naming the dog ; but it is not 

 predicating any characters as belonging to a dog, or per- 

 forming any act oi judgment with regard to a dog. Although 

 the bird may never (or but rarely) utter the name save 

 when it sees a dog, this fact is attributable to the laws of 

 association acting only in the receptual sphere : it furnishes 

 no shadow of a reason for supposing that the bird thinks 

 about a dog as a. dog, or sets the concept Dog before its 

 mind as a separate object of thought. Therefore, all my 

 opponents must allow that in one sense of the word there 

 may be names without concepts : whether as gestures or 

 as words (vocal gestures), there may be signs of things 

 without these signs presenting any vestige of predicative 

 value. Names of this kind I have called denotative : they 

 are marks affixed to objects, qualities, actions, &c., by 

 receptual association alone. 



Next, when a denotative name has been formed and 

 applied as the mark of one thing, its use may be extended to 

 denote also another thing, which is seen to belong to the 

 same class or kind. When denotative names are thus 

 extended, they become what I have called connotative. The 

 degree to which such classificatory extension of a denotative 

 name may take place depends, of course, on the degree in 

 which the mind is able to take co^fnizance of resemblances 



