192 MENTAL EVOLUTION IN MAN. 



complaint. They have raised objections to the theory of 

 evolution on purely psychological grounds. I meet their 

 objections upon these their own grounds, and therefore the 

 only way in which they can answer me is by showing that 

 there is something wrong in my psychological analysis. This 

 I fearlessly invite them to do. For all the distinctions which 

 I have made I have made out of consideration to the 

 exigencies of their argument. Although these distinctions 

 may appear somewhat bewilderingly numerous, I do not 

 anticipate that any competent psychologist will complain of 

 them on account of their having been over-finely drawn. For 

 each of them marks off an important territory of ideation, and 

 all the territories so marked off must be separately noted, if the 

 alleged distinction of kind between one and another is to be 

 seriously investigated. In his essays upon the theory of 

 evolution, Mr. Mivart not unfrequently complains of the dis- 

 regard of psychological analysis which is betokened by any 

 expression of opinion to the effect, that as between one 

 great territory of ideation and another there is only a 

 difference of degree. But surely this complaint comes with 

 an ill grace from a writer who bases an opposite opinion upon 

 a precisely similar neglect — or upon a bare statement of the 

 greatest and most obvious of all the distinctions in psychology, 

 without so much as any attempt to analyze it. Therefore, if 

 my own attempt to do this has erred on the side of over- 

 elaboration, it has done so only on account of my desire to do 

 full justice to the opposite side. In the result, I claim to have 

 shown that if it is possible to suggest a difference of kind 

 between any of the levels of ideation which have now been 

 defined, this can only be done at the last of them — or where 

 the advent of self-consciousness enables a mind, not only 

 to knozi\ but to knoiv that it knozvs ; not only to receive 

 knowledge, but also to conceive it ; not only to connotate, but 

 also to denominate ; not only to state a truth, but also to state 

 that truth as true. The question, therefore, which now lies 

 before us is that as to the nature of this self-consciousness — 

 or, more accurately, whether the great and peculiar distinction 



