S£LF-coxsc/orsxi:ss. 197 



going very much further than a brute in the way of causing 

 one idea to start from another irrespective of immediate 

 stimulation from without. ]\Iy point here is merely to 

 remark that the ideation of brutes is not wholly dependent 

 on such stimulation ; but is capable, in a certain humble 

 degree, of forming independent chains of its own. 



The next thing which I desire to be remembered in 

 connection with the ideation of brutes is, that it is not 

 restricted to the mere reproduction in memory of particular 

 objects of sensuous impressions ; but, as we have so fully seen 

 in Chapter III., admits of undergoing that amount of mental 

 elaboration which belongs to what I have termed recepts. 



Furthermore, the foundations of self-consciousness are 

 largely laid in the fact that an organism is one connected 

 whole ; all the parts are mutually related in the unity 

 of individual sensibility. Every stimulus supplied from 

 without, every movement originating from within, carries 

 with it the character of belonging to that which feels and 

 moves. Hence a brute, like a young child, has learnt to 

 distinguish its own members, and likewise its whole body, 

 from all other objects ; it knows how to avoid sources of 

 pain, how to seek those of pleasure ; and it also knows that 

 particular movements follow from particular volitions, while 

 in connection with such movements it constantly experiences 

 the same muscular sensations. Of course such knowledge 

 and such experience all belong to the receptual order ; but 

 this does not hinder that they play a most important part in 

 laying the foundations of a consciousness of individuality.* 



Lastly, and I believe of still more importance in the 

 present connection than any of the above-named antecedents, 

 a large proportional number of the recepts of a brute have 

 reference, not to objects of sense, or even to muscular 

 sensations, but to the mental states of other animals. That is 



* In the opinion of Wundt, the most important of all conditions to the genesis 

 of self-consciousness is given by the muscular sense in acts of voluntary movement 

 ( Vorlesungen iiber die Menschen und Thierseele, i8 vorl.). While agreeing with him 

 that this is a highly important condition, I think the others above mentioned arc 

 quite as much, or even more so. 



