404 MEXTAL EVOLUTIOX IX M.IX. 



tutcd a distinction between "lower concepts" and "highcr 

 conccpts," meaning by the former the conceptual naming of 

 recepts, and by the latter a similar naming of other concepts. 

 So that altogether four large and consecutive territories were 

 thus marked out: (i) Lower Recepts, which are co-extensive 

 with the psychology of existing animals, including a verj^ 

 young child ; (2) Higher Recepts, which occupy a psycho- 

 logical area between the recepts of animals and the first 

 appearance of self-consciousness in man ; (3) Lower Concepts, 

 which are concerned only with the self-conscious naming of 

 recepts ; (4) Higher Concepts, which have to do with the 

 self-conscious classification of other concepts known as such, 

 and the self-conscious naming of such ideal integrations as 

 may result therefrom. 



Now% if all this is true of naming, clearly it must also be 

 true of judging. If there is a stage of pre-conceptual naming 

 (denotation), there must also be a stage of pre-conceptual 

 judgment, of which such naming is the expression. No 

 doubt, in strictness, the term judgment should be reserved 

 for conceptual thought (denomination) ; but, in order to 

 avoid an undue multiplication of terms, 1 prefer thus to qualify 

 the existing word "judgment." Such, indeed, has already 

 been the practice among psychologists, who speak of " in- 

 tuitive judgments" as occurring even in acts of perception. 

 All, therefore, that I propose to do is to institute two addi- 

 tional classes of non-conceptual judgment — namely, lower 

 receptual and higher receptual, or, more briefly, receptual and 

 pre-conceptual. If one may speak of an "intuitive," "uncon- 

 scious," or " perceptual " judgment (as when we mistake 

 a hollow bowl for a sphere), much more may we speak 

 of a receptual judgment (as when a sea-bird dives from a 

 height into water, but will not do so upon land), or a pre-con- 

 ceptual judgment (as when a young child will extend the use 

 of a denotative name without any denominative conception). 

 In all, then, we have four phases of ideation to which the 

 term judgment may be thus either literally or metaphorically 

 applied — namely, the perceptual, receptual, pre-conceptual, 



