GENERAL SUMMARY AXD CONCLUDIXG REMARKS. 405 



and conceptual. Of these the last only is judgment, properly 

 so called. Therefore I do not say that a brute really judges 

 when, without any self-conscious thought, it brings together 

 certain reminiscences of its past experience in the form of 

 recepts, and translates for us the result of its ideation by the 

 performance of what ^Ir. Mivart calls "practical inferences." 

 Neither do I say that a brute really judges when, still without 

 self-conscious thought, it learns correctly to employ denotative 

 names. Nay, I should deny that a brute really judges even 

 if, after it is able to denotate separately two different recepts 

 (as is done by a talking bird), it were to name these two 

 recepts simultaneously when thus combined in an act of 

 " practical inference." Although there would then be the 

 outward semblance of a proposition, we should not be strictly 

 right in calling it a proposition. It would, indeed, be the 

 statement of a truth perceived ; but not the statement of a 

 truth perceived as true. 



Now, if all this be admitted in the case of a brute — as it 

 must be by any one who takes his stand on the faculty 

 of true or conceptual judgment, — obviously it must also be 

 admitted in the case of the growing child. In other words, 

 if it can be proved that a child is able to state a truth before 

 it is able to state a truth as true, it is thereby proved that 

 in the psychological history of every human being there is 

 first the kind of predication which is required for dealing with 

 receptual knowledge, or for the stating of truths perceived ; 

 and next the completed judgment which is required for 

 dealing with conceptual knowledge, or of stating truths 

 perceived as true. Of course the condition required for the 

 raising of this lower kind of judgment and this lower kind 

 of predication (if, for the sake of convenience, we agree to use 

 these terms) into the higher or only true kind of judgment 

 and predication, is the advent of self-consciousness. Or, in 

 other words, the place where a mere statement of truth first 

 passes into a real predication of truth, is determined by the 

 place at which there first supervenes the faculty of introspec- 

 tive reflection. The whole issue is thus reduced to an 



