410 ME XT A I. EVOLUTIOX IN MAX. 



manifestations, in different regions of psychological inquiry, 

 of the same psychological distinctions. And we have seen 

 that the distinction between a Recept and a Concept, which is 

 thus carried through all the fjibric of mind, is really the onl}- 

 distinction about which there can be any dispute. More- 

 over, we have seen that the distinction is on all hands allowed 

 to depend on the presence or absence of self-consciousness. 

 Lastly, we have seen that even in the province of self-con- 

 sciousness itself the same distinction admits of being traced : 

 there is a form of self-consciousness which may be termed 

 rcceptual, as well as that which may be termed conceptual. 

 The whole question before us thus resolves itself into an 

 inquir}' touching the relation between these two forms of 

 self-consciousness : is it or is it not observable that the one 

 is devclopmentally continuous with the other? Can we or 

 can we not perceive that in the growing child the powers of 

 receptual self-conciousness, which it shares with a brute, pass 

 by slow and natural stages into those powers of conceptual 

 self-consciousness which are distinctive of a man ? 



This question was fully considered in Chapter XI. I had 

 previously shown that so far as the earliest, or indicative 

 phase of language is concerned, no difference even of degree 

 can be alleged between the infant and the animal. I had also 

 shown that neither could any such difference be alleged with 

 regard to the earlier stages of the next two phases — namel}-, 

 the denotative and the receptually connotative. Moreover, 

 I had shown that no difference of kind could be alleged 

 between this lower receptual utterance which a child shares 

 witli a brute, and that higher receptual utterance which it 

 proceeds to develop prior to the advent of self-consciousness. 

 Lastly, I had shown that this higher receptual utterance gives 

 to the child a psychological instrument whereby to work its 

 way from a merely receptual to an incipiently conceptual 

 consciousness of self Such being the state of the facts as 

 established by my previous analysis, I put to my opponents 

 the following dilemma. Taking the case of a child about two 

 years old, who is able to frame such a rudimentary, com- 



