GENERAL SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REM ARIZ'S. 4I I 



municative, or pre-conceptual proposition as " Dit ki " (Sister 

 is crying), I proceeded thus. 



"Dit" is the denotative name of one recept, "ki" the deno- 

 tative name of another : the object and the action which these 

 two recepts severall}^ represent happen to occur together 

 before the child's observation : the child, therefore, denotes 

 them simultaneously — i.e. brings them into apposition. The 

 apposition in consciousness of these two recepts, with their 

 corresponding denotations, is thus effected for the child by 

 the logic of events : it is not effected by the child in the way 

 of any intentional or self-conscious grouping of its ideas, such 

 as we have seen to be the distinguishing feature of the logic 

 of concepts. Here, then, comes the dilemma. For I say, either 

 you here have conceptual judgment, or else you have not. 

 If you say that this is conceptual judgment, you destroy the 

 basis of your own distinction between man and brute, because 

 then you must also say that brutes conceptually judge — the 

 child as yet not having attained to conceptual self-conscious- 

 ness. If, on the other hand, you say that here you have not 

 conceptual judgment, inasmuch as you have not self-con- 

 sciousness, I ask at what stage in the subsequent development 

 of the child's intelligence you would consider conceptual 

 judgment to arise. Should you answer that it first arises 

 when conceptual self-consciousness first supplies the condition 

 to its arising, I must refer you to the proof already given that 

 the advent of self-consciousness is itself a gradual process, the 

 precedent conditions of which are supplied far down in the 

 animal series. But if this is so, where the faculty of stating a 

 truth perceived passes into the higher faculty of perceiving 

 the truth as true, there is a continuous series of gradations 

 connecting the one faculty with the other. Up to the point 

 where this continuous series of gradations begins, the mind of 

 the child is, as I have already proved, indistinguishable from 

 the mind of an animal by any one principle of psychology. 

 Will you, then, maintain that up to this time the two orders 

 of psychical existence are identical in kind, but that during 

 its ascent through this final series of crradations tlie human 



