420 MENTAL EVOLUTION IN MAN. 



kind of classification with which rccepts are concerned is that 

 which lies nearest to the automatic groupings of sensuous 

 perception : it depends on an absence of any power analyti- 

 cally to distinguish less perceptible points of difference among 

 more conspicuous points of resemblance — or non-essential 

 analogies among essential analogies with which they happen 

 to be frequently associated in experience. On the other 

 hand, the kind of classification with which concepts are 

 concerned is that which lies furthest from the automatic 

 groupings of sensuous perception : it depends on the power 

 of analytically distinguishing between essentials and non- 

 essentials among resemblances which occur associated to- 

 gether in experience. Classification there doubtless is in 

 both cases ; but in the one it is due to the obviousness 

 of analogies, while in the other it is due to the mental dis- 

 sociation of analogies as apparent and real. Or else, in the 

 one case it is due to constancy of association in experience 

 of the objects, attributes, actions, &c., classified ; while in the 

 other case it is due to a conscious disregard of such association. 

 Now, if we remember these things, we can no longer 

 wonder that the palaeontology of speech should prove early 

 roots to have been expressive of "generic," as distinguished 

 from "general" ideas. The naming of actions and processes 

 so habitual, or so immediately apparent to perception, as 

 those to which the "121 concepts" tabulated by Professor 

 Max Mliller refer, does not betoken an order of ideation 

 very much higher than the pre-conceptual, in virtue of which 

 a young child is able to give expression to its higher recep- 

 tual life, prior to the advent of self- consciousness. In view 

 of these considerations, my only wonder is that the 121 root- 

 words do not present better evidence of conceptual thought. 

 This, however, only shows how comparatively small a part 

 self-conscious reflection need play in the practical life of 

 early man, even when so far removed from the really 

 " primitive " condition of hitherto wordless man as was that 

 of the pastoral people who have left this record of ideation 

 in the roots of Aryan speech. 



