NA TURE 



541 



THURSDAY, OCTOBER 19. 1876 



MAUDS LEY'S ''PHYSIOLOGY OF MIND'' 



The Physiology of Mind. Being the First Part of a 

 Third Edition, Revised, Enlarged, and in great part 

 Re-written, of "The Physiology and Pathology of 

 Mind." By Henry Maudsley, M.D. (London : Mac- 

 millan and Co., 1876.) 



MAN very long ago, probably about the time he 

 became man, reflected that he felt and thought ; 

 since then no one has ever had the least doubt, as to 

 whether a given object of thought was a fact of mind or 

 of body ; and every attempt to resolve the one into the 

 other has been but the vain enterprise of a misguided 

 intelligence. The physical and mental stand over against 

 each other — the fundamental duality of being which no 

 effort of thought has been able to transcend. How, after 

 reflecting that they felt, our far-ofif ancestors came to refer 

 their feelings and reflections to a soul or spiritual entity, 

 which they supposed to inhabit and animate the body, to 

 cause and direct its movements, can never be more 

 than a subject of speculation. But that such was 

 the universal belief of mankind, that such is still the 

 creed of all save a few, and that all language has been 

 evolved under this conception, scarcely requires to be 

 stated. For ages the curious speculated around the 

 fascinating mystery of the union of soul and body — and 

 yet the mystery remained. A slow change of view, how- 

 ever, was taking place. From the belief that the life 

 and movement, the health and disease of the body, 

 were in some way directly dependent on a conscious, 

 thinking soul, we have passed gradually, very gradu- 

 ally, to the view held by that body of thinkers who 

 claim to be the scientific psychologists of the present day, 

 which is, that mind, feeling, and thought, in a word, con- 

 sciousness, is dependent on bodily organisation. Dr. 

 Maudsley presents the volume before us as a treatise or 

 " disquisition, by the light of existing knowledge, con- 

 cerning the nervous structures and functions which are 

 the probable physical foundations, or the objective aspects 

 of, those natural phenomena which appear in conscious- 

 ness as feelings and thoughts, and are known only in that 

 way." 



Ten years ago, when Dr. Maudsley published the first 

 edition of his work, " The Physiology and Pathology of 

 Mind," of which the volume before us is the first part 

 much enlarged, there was a need, which no longer exists, 

 for iterating and reiterating the evidence of the invariable 

 and uniform connection of mental phenomena with ner- 

 vous organisation. This useful work Dr. Maudsley did 

 well, and as he himself says, " with all the vehemence of 

 youthful enthusiasm." The dependence of consciousness 

 on nervous organisation may be claimed as fairly estab- 

 lished, and the great question that now presses on the 

 attention of the scientific psychologist is. What mode of 

 connection can we figure to ourselves as the relation sub- 

 sisting between consciousness and the material organism? 

 We are among those who maintain that to this problem 

 no acceptable solution has yet been proposed. Dr. 

 Maudsley thinks otherwise, and much of the present 

 Vol. XIV.- No. 364 



volume is taken up with attempts to unveil this deepest of 

 nature's mysteries. We have come to believe, taking it 

 as established, that for a given fact of nervous action 

 the corresponding fact of consciousness will ever be 

 the same. The question now is, in what relation does 

 this fact of consciousness stand to the constantly related, 

 but totally unlike, phenomena which we describe as 

 nervous action ? The phenomena, it is answered, are not 

 so totally unlike. " Above all things it is now necessary," 

 says Dr. Maudsley, " that the absolute and unholy 

 barrier set up between psychical and physical nature be 

 broken down, and that a just conception (of mind) be 

 formed, founded on a faithful recognition of all those 

 phenomena of nature which lead, by imperceptible gra- 

 dations, up to this its highest evolution." (We continue 

 the quotation simply as illustrating Dr. Maudsley's style, 

 which we venture to think is still at times rather above 

 the sober unimpassioned language of science.) " Happily, 

 the beneficial change is being gradually effected, and 

 ignorant prejudice or offended self-love in vain opposes a 

 progress in knowledge which reflects the course of pro- 

 gress in nature ; the stars in their courses fight for such 

 truth, and its angry adversary might as well hope to 

 blow out with his pernicious breath the all-inspiring light 

 of the sun as to extinguish its ever-waxing splendour." 

 Well, the unholy barrier between psychical and physical 

 nature has to be broken down, and to this end we are 

 called on to form a conception of mind which will enable 

 us to conceive it as a product of physical evolution. 

 Complete failure has, we think, been the reward of every 

 one who has ventured on this most hopeless undertakmg 

 (see our article " Cosmic Philosophy," Nature, August 

 5, 1875). Let us see, however, how Dr. Maudsley would 

 have us proceed. In the first place, we are invited to 

 perceive distinctly " that consciousness is not co-extensive 

 with mind, that it is not mind but an incidental accom- 

 paniment of mind." This is certainly a large demand 

 to begin with, and we would rather be with those 

 who would maintain "that it is improper and indeed 

 absurd to speak of mind except when speaking of states 

 of consciousness." The word " mind " has been used by 

 all mankind to denote states of consciousness, and not a 

 material organism, nor the changes in an organism. The 

 philosophers also are against Dr. Maudsley, but of these 

 he makes little account. We may notice in passing, 

 however, that, in preparing for criticism Prof. Bain's 

 statement that mind is " the sum total of subject experi- 

 ences, that which has not extension," he finds it con- 

 venient to " alter the wording of it " so as to make it 

 " run thus — mind is the sum total of the experiences of 

 that which has not extension, that which has not exten- 

 sion being a subject!" We can only suppose that Dr. 

 Maudsley has wholly misunderstood Prof. Bain's words. 

 Prof. Bain, as we understand him, means to give a double 

 description of mind— it is the sum total of subject experi- 

 ences, or again, it is that which has not extension. The 

 difference between this and the statement— mind is the 

 sum total of the experiences of that which has not exten- 

 sion — is obvious. 



But to proceed. By insisting that '*' emotions good or 

 bad are physical phenomena," " that ideas are insensible 

 motions of nerve-molecules, of the nature of vibrations," 

 Dr. Maudsley can without much further violence to 



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