February 15, 191 2] 



NATURE 



509 



" The doctrine of evolution enjoins us to learn the 

 rules of the great game of life which we must play, 

 as science reveals them to us. It is well to 

 remember that a little knowledge is a dangerous 

 thing, but because evolution is true always and every- 

 where, an understanding of its workings in any de- 

 partment of thought and life clears the vision of other 

 realms of knowledge and action. . . . Evolution as a 

 complete doctrine commands everyone to live a life of 

 service as full as hereditary endowments and surround- 

 ing circumstances will permit." 



After reading this admirable course of lectures, one 

 general criticism arises in our mind — one, however, 

 involving for its statement a longer discussion than 

 is possible here and now. It appears to us that the 

 author has not sufficient^ analysed his " deeply 

 grounded conviction that evolution has been continuous 

 throughout." We wish to know more about this con- 

 tinuity—what it is that is continuous, and whether 

 the continuity implies that there is an identity of 

 causes throughout. The genetic method is certainly 

 applicable, but do the same categories serve through- 

 out? Is the truth with Spencer or with Bergson? 

 It seems to us to be giving a False simplicity to the 

 facts to conclude that "human social relations are 

 biological relations," or that " identical biological 

 laws, uniform in their operation everywhere in the 

 organic world, have controlled the origin and estab- 

 lishment of even the most complex societies of men." 

 It seems to us a matter for regret that a zoologist of 

 Prof. Crampton's eminence should adopt, especially 

 in a work of this sort, the mechanistic hypothesis 

 ■without giving a statement of the other side. We are 

 unaware that a mechanical description has been given 

 of any complete vital operation, and if it were given 

 we do not think that it would be what the biologist 

 wants, for he cannot get away from the fact that 

 the organism is a historical being. 



We are only stating our opinion, but we think there 

 is need for reconsidering, even in the light of other 

 parts of the book, such a deliverance as this : — 



" Does s.cience teach us, then, that the ultimate 

 elements of human faculty are carbon-«es5 and 

 hydrogen-nes5 and oxygen-nf55, which in themselves 

 are not mind, but which when they are combined, 

 and when such chemical atoms exist in protoplasm, 

 constitute mental powers? Plain common-sense 

 answers in the affirmative." 



And this : — 



"What can be the source of mentality, if it is not 

 something brought in from the outer world along 

 with the chemical substances which taken singly are 

 devoid of mind? Scientific monism frankly replies 

 that it is unable to find another origin." 



Such a presentation of the old problem seems to us 

 disappointing, especially when it comes from the 

 country of William James and Josiah Royce. 



(2) Prof. Schneider has prepared an enlarged 

 edition of an admirable book which was reviewed 

 in Nature of January lo, 1907. It then con- 

 sisted of six lectures introductory to the study of organic 

 evolution, and was marked by clearness and freshness 

 of exposition. It had also the crowning merit of 

 being short, and was a pleasing contrast to a number 

 of larger books of similar aim, which take a longer 

 NO. 2207, VOL. 88] 



time to say less. In its new edition, however, it has 

 surrendered the charm of brevity in the hope of secur- 

 ing other excellencies. It has become thirty-five lec- 

 tures instead of six, and each lecture occupies about 

 ten closely printed pages. What are the features of 

 this practically new book, which, it may be noted, is 

 not to be confused with the author's " Versuch einer 

 Begriindung der Deszendenztheorie " ? 



Perhaps the chief characteristic is the elaboration 

 of the concept of "Anlagen" or primordia. The 

 common way of looking at these as simply material 

 structures will not stand criticism. In place of the 

 view that morphogenetic differentiation may be inter- 

 preted in terms of the chemico-physical properties of 

 the primordia, Schneider seeks to substitute a re- 

 habilitation of the "idea-theory" of Plato and Goethe, 

 with which he combines the Aristotelian-Scholastic 

 concept of potency, "elaborated in a modern e.xact 

 fashion." Another feature of the book is a judicious 

 eclecticism. For while there is much that is personal 

 and original throughout, such as the author's theory 

 of vitalism, his welcome, but all too short, discussion 

 of the importance of periodicity, his criticism of the 

 ordinary Darwinian position, and so on, there \s a 

 praiseworthy attempt to recognise a measure of 

 validity in the suggestions of the various schools. 

 He pleads for less purely argumentative criticism, for 

 a deeper inquiry into fundamental principles, for a 

 study of biological method, and for more determined 

 effort to get away from preconceptions which influence 

 even the experimenters. The Lamarckian, he says, 

 will not hear of mutations, and the Mutationist will 

 not hear of modifications. The Darwinist rejects the 

 psychical theory of adaptations, and the psycho- 

 Lamarckian rejects determinants. The student of 

 chromosomes does away with .Anlagen, the " Ortho- 

 genetiker" with adaptations, the vitalist of Driesch's 

 persuasion with vital energy, the Weismannist with 

 the transmission of acquired characters, the Mechanist 

 with all vitalistic principles, and so on. But all these 

 views have factual relations, and there is a kernel of 

 truth in each. They cannot be lumped together, but 

 no view is as yet complete enough to dispense with 

 the aid of others. Cooperation as well as criticism 

 is needed among the evolutionists. 



In his sketch of the evolutionism of the future. Prof. 

 Schneider distinguishes primary or constitutive prin- 

 ciples and secondary or auxiliary principles. The 

 primary principles are three :—(i) The idea, which 

 interpenetrates every organism and binds it into unity ; 

 (2) entelechy, which is "a kind of cohesion in the 

 idea," holding the constellation of Anlagen in a specific 

 order, a correlating, regulative, formative principle; 

 and (j) vitality, a form of energy, like heat in the 

 inorganic realm, which brings into material explicit- 

 ness what is implicit in the idea, and includes two 

 main factors, of assimilation, growth, and reproduc- 

 tion on one hand, of variation on the other. 



The secondary or auxiliary principles, which repre- 

 sent a complication of the primary simplicity of idea, 

 entelechy, and vitality, are of two kinds, ectogenous 

 and endogenous. The ectogenous principles operate 

 from without; they do not originate within the 

 organism. They include the influence of environ- 



