FACULTIES THAT CONSTITUTE THE INTELLECT. 323 



ation, and reason. Sensation he defines to be the faculty of the mind, 

 which affords the perception of any sensitive impression. Attention, 

 the faculty of sensation, applied exclusively to a determinate object; 

 being, as the word imports, the tension of the mind upon a particular 

 object. Comparison, the faculty of sensation, applied to two objects at 

 once. Judgment, the faculty by which the mind perceives the con- 

 nexions, that exist between the objects compared. Reason, the faculty 

 of running through a succession of judgments, which are connected 

 with, and deduced from, each other. Reflection, as the word indicates, 

 the faculty by which the mind returns upon itself, upon its own products, 

 to prove their correctness, and to subject them again to its power; and 

 imagination, to which Condillac attaches memory, the faculty pos- 

 sessed by the mind of reproducing at will the different impressions, and 

 all the products of its own operations. With regard to the order of 

 catenation of these different faculties, he considers sensation to be first 

 put in play; and if, amongst the perceptions, there is one, of which we 

 have a more lively consciousness, and which attracts the mind to it 

 alone, it is the product of attention : then comes comparison, which is 

 nothing more than double attention : comparison is irresistibly succeeded 

 by judgment: if, from one judgment, we pass to another deduced from 

 it, we reason; if the mind turns back on its own production, we reflect: 

 and lastly, if the mind spontaneously awakens its different perceptions 

 imagination is in action. All these faculties are thus made to be de- 

 duced from each other; to originate in the first or sensation; and all 

 are sensation successively transformed. 



The doctrine of M. Condillac, abstractly considered, has already 

 engaged attention. The division of the faculties, which he conceives, 

 by their aggregation, to form the intellect, is simple and ingenious, and 

 appears to be more easily referable to physiological principles than that 

 of other metaphysicians ; accordingly, it has been embraced, with more 

 or less modification, by certain physiological writers. 



The power of reflection, according to M. Broussais, is the character- 

 istic of the human intellect ; and to reflect is to feel. Man not only 

 feels the stimulation produced by external agents, and by the move- 

 ments of his own organs, which constitutes sensation or perception, but 

 he is conscious that he has felt these stimulations: in other words, he 

 feels that he has felt; he has, consequently, a perception of his actual 

 perception, which, M. Broussais says, constitutes mental reflection. This 

 process he can repeat as often as he thinks fit, and can observe all his 

 sensations, and the different modes in which he felt, whilst occupied with 

 his feelings. From this study he derives an idea of his own existence. 

 "He distinguishes himself," to quote the dry description of M. Broussais, 

 "in the midst of creation, and paying regard only to his own exist- 

 ence, compared with all that is not himself, he pronounces the word 

 I, (moi,) and says, I am; and viewing himself in action, says, I act, 

 I do, &c. Perception of himself and of other bodies procures him what 

 are denominated ideas. This is, therefore, another result of reflection; 

 in other words, of the faculty he possesses of feeling himself feel. But 

 man feels, besides, that he has already felt: this constitutes memory. 

 In comparing two perceptions with each other, which are felt in sue- 



