324 MENTAL FACULTIES. 



cession, a third perception results, which is judgment. Consequently, 

 to judge is only to feel." " Hence," he concludes, "sensation, reflection, 

 and judgment are absolutely synonymous, and present to the physiolo- 

 gist nothing more than the same phenomenon. The will, or the faculty 

 by virtue of which man manifests his liberty by choosing, among dif- 

 ferent perceptions, the one he must obey ; the faculty, which gives him 

 the power of resisting, to a certain extent, the suggestions of instinct 

 is founded on reflection. Consequently, when we consider it in a 

 physiological point of view, we can only discover in it the faculty of 

 feeling ourselves, and of perceiving that we feel ourselves." 



Some of the later French metaphysicians have proposed certain 

 modifications of the system of Condillac. M. De La Romiguiere, 1 for 

 instance, denies that sensation is the original faculty, and derives all 

 from attention. The mind, he remarks, is passive during the reception 

 of sensation, and does not commence action until directed to some ob- 

 ject, or until it attends. According to him, the intellect consists of 

 three faculties attention; comparison or double attention ; and reason 

 or double comparison. Judgment, imagination, and memory are not 

 primary faculties : judgment is the irresistible product of comparison ; 

 memory is but the trace, which every perception necessarily leaves 

 behind it ; and imagination is but a dependence on reason. M. Des- 

 tutt-Tracy, 2 again, reduces the number of primary faculties to four 

 perception, memory, judgment, and will or desire. According to him, 

 attention is not an elementary faculty. It is but the active exercise of 

 the intellectual faculties. The same applies to reflection and reason, 

 which are only a judiciously combined employment of those faculties; 

 and to comparison and imagination, both of which enter into the judg- 

 ment. This division is embraced by M. Magendie. 3 Mr. Dugald 

 Stewart's 4 classification is into, 1, Intellectual powers, and, 2, Active 

 and moral powers; including, in the former, perception, attention, con- 

 ception, abstraction, the associating principle, memory, imagination, 

 and reason. Dr. Brown 5 reduces all the intellectual states to simple 

 suggestion and relative suggestion, comprising in the former, concep- 

 tion, memory, and imagination, in the latter, judgment, reason, ab- 

 straction, and taste. Dr. Abercrombie 6 considers the mental operations 

 to be chiefly referable to four heads, memory, abstraction, imagina- 

 tion, and reason or judgment; whilst Kant has twenty-five primary 

 faculties or forms ; pure conceptions or ideas a priori. 



These are a few only of the discrepant divisions of psychologists. 

 The list might have been extended by the classifications of Aristotle, 

 Bacon, Hobbes, Locke, Bonnet, Hume, Vauvenargues, Diderot, Reid, 

 and others. Perhaps the most prevalent opinion at present is, that the 

 original faculties are perception, memory, judgment, and imagination. 

 It is impossible, were it even our province, to reconcile these discre- 



1 Lemons de Philosophie, torn. i. 4eme lecon. 



2 Elemens d'ldeologie, 2de edit., Paris, 1804. 3 Precis Elementaire, i. 196. 



* Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind, 3d edit., Lond., 1808; and Amer. 

 edit., Brattleborough, Vt., IS 13. 



5 Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind, Amer. edit., Boston, 1826. 



6 Inquiries concerning the Intellectual Powers, Amer. edit., p. 91, New York, 1832. 



