350 MENTAL FACULTIES. 



complains of acute pain in the nape of the neck ; and this part is more 

 tumid and hot in animals at the rutting season. Gall asserts, that he 

 had noticed in birds, that the cerebellum is not the same in size and ex- 

 citement during the season of love as at other times ; and he affirms, 

 that if erection be observed in those who are hanged, or in consequence 

 of the application of a blister or a seton to the nape of the neck, or of 

 the use of opium, or in such as are threatened with apoplexy, especially 

 when the apoplexy is cerebellous, 1 or during sleep, the effect is, in all 

 these cases, owing to congestion of blood in the brain in general, and in 

 the cerebellum in particular. From these data, Gall concludes, that the 

 cerebellum is the organ of the instinct of reproduction ; and he remarks, 

 that as this organ presides over one of the most important faculties, it 

 is situate on the median line ; and at the base of the skull. In this 

 manner, he proceeds, with more or less success, in his investigation of 

 the other cerebral organs and faculties. 



But Gall does not restrict himself to the physiological applications 

 of his system. He endeavours to explain the differences that exist 

 between him and other philosophers. He rejects the primary faculties 

 of instinct, intelligence, will, liberty, reason, perception, memory, judg- 

 ment, &c., of the metaphysician, as mere generalizations of the mind, 

 or common attributes of the true primary faculties. Whilst, in the 

 study of physics, the general and special qualities of matter have been 

 carefully distinguished, and the latter have been regarded as alone 

 deciding the particular nature of bodies, the metaphysician, says Gall, 

 has restricted himself to general qualities. For example, it is asserted, 

 that "to think is to feel." Thought is, doubtless, a phenomenon of 

 sensibility; but it is a sensitive act of a certain kind. To adhere 

 rigidly to this expression, says Gall, is but to express a generality, 

 which leaves us in as much ignorance as to what thought is, as we 

 should be of a quadruped or bird, by saying that it is an animal ; and 

 as, to become acquainted with such animals, their qualities must be 

 specified, so to understand thought, the kind of sensation that consti- 

 tutes it must be specified. Instinct, according to him, is a general 

 expression, denoting every kind of internal impulse ; and, consequently, 

 there must be as many instincts as there are fundamental faculties. 

 Intelligence is likewise a general expression, designating the faculty of 

 knowledge ; and as there are many instincts, so there are many kinds 

 of intelligence. Philosophers, he thinks, have erroneously ascribed 

 instinct to animals, and intelligence to man. All animals have, to a 

 certain extent, intelligence ; and in man many faculties are instincts. 

 Neither is the will a fundamental faculty. It is only a judgment 

 formed amongst several motives, and the result of the concourse of 

 actions of several faculties. There are as many desires as faculties ; 

 but there is only one will, which is the product of the simultaneous 

 action of the intellectual forces. So that the will is frequently in op- 



1 A case of Arachnitis Cerebelli in which there was genital excitement is reported by 

 the author, in Lond. Med. Rep. for Oct., 1822. For cases of cerebellous disease, without 

 genital excitement, see Duplay, in Archives Generales de Medecine, Nov., 1836; Miiller's 

 Elements of Physiology, by Baly, 1st edit. p. 833, Lond., 1838 ; and Longet, Anat. et Physiol. 

 du Systeme Nerveux, torn. i. Paris, 1842; and Traite de Physiologic, ii. 267, Paris, 1850. 



