VIEWS OF PHRENOLOGISTS. 351 



position to the desires. The same may be said of liberty and reason ; 

 to the former applies what has been remarked of the will, and the latter 

 is only the judgment formed by the superior intellectual faculties. In 

 this respect, however, he remarks, it must not be confounded with in- 

 telligence : many animals are intelligent, but man alone is rational. 



On the other hand, what are termed, in the intellect, perception, 

 memory, judgment, imagination, &c., are attributes common to all the 

 intellectual faculties ; and cannot, consequently, be considered primary 

 faculties. Each faculty has its perception, memory, judgment, and 

 imagination; and, therefore, there are as many kinds of perception, 

 memory, judgment, and imagination, as there are primary intellectual 

 faculties. This is so true, says Gall, that we may have the memory 

 and the judgment perfect upon one point, and totally defective upon 

 another. The memory of musical tones, for instance, is not the same 

 as that of language ; and he who possesses the one may not have the 

 other. The imaginations, again, of the poet, musician, and philoso- 

 pher, differ essentially from each other. These faculties are, therefore, 

 according to him, nothing more than different modes of the activity of 

 all the faculties. Each faculty perceives the notion to which it has 

 been attracted, or has perception ; each preserves and renews the re- 

 collection of this notion, or has memory. All are disposed to act 

 without being excited to action from without, when the organs are 

 largely developed, or have considerable intrinsic activity: this gives 

 rise to imagination; and, lastly, every faculty exerts its function with 

 more or less perfection, whence results judgment. Attention, in his 

 view, is only the active mode of exercise of the fundamental faculties 

 of the intellect; and being an attribute of all, it cannot be called a 

 primary faculty. 



As regards the affective faculties, or w r hat have been called the 

 passions and affections. Gall, in the first place, asserts, that the term 

 passion is faulty when used to indicate a primary faculty. It ought 

 only to designate the highest degree of activity of any faculty. Every 

 faculty requires to be put into action, and according to the degree of 

 activity which it possesses, it is a desire, a taste, an inclination, a want, 

 or a passion. If it be only of the medium energy, it is a taste : if ex- 

 tremely active, a passion. There may, consequently, be as many 

 passions as there are faculties. We speak of a passion for study, or 

 a passion for music, as we do of the passion of love, or of ambition. 

 Gall objects, also, to the word affection, which, according to him, 

 expresses only the modifications presented by the primary faculties, 

 according to the mode in which external and internal influences affect 

 them. Some of these are common to all the faculties, as those of 

 pleasure and pain. Every faculty may be the occasion of one or the 

 other. Other affections are special to certain faculties; as pretension, 

 which, he says, is an affection of pride, and repentance an affection of 

 the moral sense. Finally, affections are simple or compound: simple 

 when they only bear upon one faculty, as anger, which is a simple 

 affection of the faculty of self-defence; compound, when several 

 faculties are concerned at the same time, as shame, which ^is an affec- 

 tion of the primary faculties of the moral sense and vanity'. 



