THE GREAT POLITICAL SUPERSTITION. 295 



these powers and obligations of majority and minority ; and, in the 

 absence of any agreement to co-operate, such powers and obligations 

 are also absent. 



Here the argument apparently ends in a dead-lock. Under the 

 existing condition of things no moral origin seems assignable either 

 for the sovereignty of the majority or for the limitation of its sover- 

 eignty. But further consideration reveals a solution of the difficulty. 

 For if, dismissing all thought of any hypothetical agreement to co- 

 operate heretofore made, we ask, what would be the agreement into 

 which citizens would now enter with practical unanimity, we get a 

 sufficiently clear answer ; and with it a sufficiently clear justification 

 for the rule of the majority inside a certain sphere, but not outside 

 that sphere. Let us first observe a few of the limitations which at 

 once become apparent. 



Were all Englishmen now asked if they would agree to co-operate 

 for the teaching of religion, and would give the majority power to 

 fix the creed and the forms of worship, there would come a very em- 

 phatic " No " from a large part of them. If, in pursuance of a pro- 

 posal to revive sumptuary laws, the inquiry were made whether they 

 would bind themselves to abide by the will of the majority in respect 

 of the fashions and qualities of their clothes, nearly all of them would 

 refuse. In like manner, if (to take an actual question of the day) 

 people were polled to ascertain whether, in respect of the beverages 

 they drank, they would accept the decision of the greater number, 

 half, and probably more than half, would very decidedly decline. 

 Similarly with respect to many other actions which most men now-a^ 

 days regard as of purely private concern. Whatever desire there 

 might be to co-operate for carrying on, or regulating, such actions, 

 would be far from a unanimous desire. Manifestly, then, had social 

 co-operation to be commenced by ourselves, and had its purposes to 

 be specified before consent to co-operate could be obtained, there would 

 be large parts of human conduct in respect of which co-operation would 

 be declined ; and in respect of which, consequently, no authority by 

 the majority over the minority could be rightfully exercised. 



Turn now to the converse question. For what ends would all men 

 agree to co-operate ? None will deny that for resisting invasion the 

 agreement would be practically unanimous. Excepting only the 

 Quakers, who, having done highly useful work in their time, are now 

 dying out, all would unite for defensive war (not, however, for offen- 

 sive war) ; and they would, by so doing, tacitly bind themselves to 

 conform to the will of the majority in respect of measures directed to 

 that end. There would be practical unanimity, also, in the agreement 

 to co-operate for defense against internal enemies as against external 

 enemies. Omitting criminals, all must wish to have person and prop- 

 erty adequately protected. In short, each citizen desires to preserve 

 his life, to preserve those material things which conduce to mainte- 



