472 THE POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY. 



even ridiculed any one who thought that the river out of which the 

 bubble arose and into which it would presently elapse, deserved rec- 

 ognition, would fitly typify a disciple of M. Comte, who, centering 

 all his higher sentiments on Humanity, holds it absurd to let either 

 thought or feeling be occupied with that great stream of Creative 

 Power, unlimited in Space or in Time, of which Humanity is a transi- 

 tory product. Even if, instead of being the dull leaden-hued thing 

 it is, the bubble Humanity had reached that stage of iridescence of 

 which, happily, a high sample of man or woman sometimes shows us 

 a beginning, it would still owe whatever there was in it of beauty to 

 that Infinite and Eternal Energy out of which Humanity has quite 

 recently emerged, and into which it must, in course of time, subside. 

 As with thousands of lower types of creatures which have severally 

 illustrated the truth that the life and death of the individual prefigure 

 in brief space the life and death of the race, so with this highest type 

 of creature, Man : a beginning and end to Humanity are no less cer- 

 tain than the beginning and end to each human being. And to sup- 

 pose that this relatively-evanescent form of existence ought to occupy 

 our minds so exclusively as to leave no space for a consciousness of 

 that Ultimate Existence of which it is but one form out of multitudes 

 — an Ultimate Existence which was manifested in infinitely-varied 

 ways before Humanity arose, and will be manifested in infinitely- 

 varied other ways when Humanity has ceased to be, seems very strange 

 — to me, indeed, amazing. 



And here this contrast between the positivist view and my own 

 view, equally marked now as it was at first, leads me to ask in what 

 respects the criticisms passed on the article — " Religion : a Retrospect 

 and Prospect" have affected its argument. Many years ago, as 

 also by implication in that article, I contended that while Science 

 shows that we can know phenomena only, its arguments involve no 

 denial of an Existence beyond phenomena. In common with leading 

 scientific men whose opinions are known to me, I hold that it does not 

 bring us to an ultimate negation, as the presentations of my view made 

 by Mr. Harrison and Sir James Stephen imply ; and they have done 

 nothing to show that its outcome is negative. Contrariwise, the thesis 

 many years ago maintained by me against thinkers classed as orthodox,* 

 and reasserted after this long interval, is that though the nature of the 

 Reality transcending appearances can not be known, yet that its exist- 

 ence is necessarily implied by all we do know — that though no con- 

 ception of this Reality can be framed by us, yet that an indestructible 

 consciousness of it is the very basis of our intelligence ; \ and I do 

 not find, either in Mr. Harrison's criticisms or in those of Sir James 

 Stephen, any endeavor to prove the untruth of this thesis. More- 



* " First Principles," § 26. 



f Sir James Stephen, who appears perplexed by the distinction between a conception 

 and a consciousness, will find an explanation of it in " First Principles," § 26. 



