THE MORALITY OF HAPPINESS. 669 



fostering his own capacity for enjoyment. Here again, if one wished 

 to suggest a course of action by which a man who suffered from life- 

 weariness might again know the charm of happiness, one could advise 

 no better course than to minister systematically to the enjoyments of 

 those around. The very tide of life is made fuller thus, even as the 

 tide of thought is made fuller by turning from mere reflection to a 

 interchange of ideas and thoughts with those around. While there is 

 work to be done in the way of increasing others' happiness, no man — 

 not even the most jaded and satiated — need ask himself the sickly 

 question, " Is life worth living ? " 



Especially is this so when the tide of life is ebbing. Mr. Spencer's 

 words on this point are worthy of careful study, by those in particular 

 who know of him only as the teacher of some hard, unsympathetic 

 system of Gradgrindian philosophy, for they afford an apt example of 

 his kindly and lovable teaching : 



"It is in maturity and old age that we especially see how, as 

 egoistic pleasures grow faint, altruistic actions come in to revive them 

 in new forms. The contrast between the child's delight in the novel- 

 ties daily revealed and the indifference which comes as the world 

 around grows familiar, until in adult life there remain comparatively 

 few things that are greatly enjoyed, draws from all the reflection that 

 as years go by pleasures pall. And, to those who think, it becomes 

 clear that only through sympathy can pleasures be indirectly gained 

 from things that have ceased to yield pleasures directly. In the grati- 

 fications derived by parents from the gratifications of their offspring, 

 this is conspicuously shown. Trite as is the remark that men live 

 afresh in their children, it is needful here to set it down as remind- 

 ing us of the way in which, as the egoistic satisfactions in life fade, 

 altruism renews them while it transfigures them." 



But not only does altruism increase the pleasures of life ; the ex- 

 ercise of the altruistic qualities is in itself pleasurable. The state of 

 mind when kindly actions are performed affords pleasure. It directly 

 increases happiness, and thus (like other pleasures) enhances physical 

 well-being. It is true that a sympathetic nature suffers where a hard 

 and callous nature would feel no pain. ITndue altruism has no doubt 

 its bad effects, nor can it be denied that even such altruistic feelings 

 as are desirable for the social well-being cause, at times, some degrees 

 of suffering ; but the exercise of the altruistic qualities is in the main 

 pleasurable, and it can not be doubted that altruistic emotions give 

 more pleasure than sorrow. When we sorrow for a friend's grief we 

 experience pain and undergo such depression of the vital functions as 

 always accompanies pain ; but in the long-run the joy felt in sym- 

 pathy with the joys of others surpasses the sorrow occasioned by 

 their troubles. 



Then, too, it must be remembered that those pleasures which we 

 derive from the arts owe a large part of their value to altruistic emo- 



