August 15, 1889] 



NATURE 



36: 



for their motto " We must go back to Kant," while in 

 England the able commentaries of Prof. Caird and Prof. 

 Watson have been succeeded by the studies of Dr. 

 Hutchinson Stirling, Prof. Max Miiller, and Dr. Mahaffy. 

 The old translation of Mr. Meiklejohn still holds its own, 

 though Mr. Belfort Bax and others have tried their 

 hands on Kant, and made many improvements in detail. 

 It is clear that the famous " Kritik of Pure Reason" is 

 still regarded as a necessary element in all philosophic 

 education, and as likely to continue longer -in fashion 

 than the more brilliant but less solid speculations of Scho- 

 penhauer and Von Hartmann, as well as of the more 

 legitimate descendants of the Konigsberg school. 



There are certain well-known difficulties in Kant's 

 philosophy to which the reader naturally turns when he 

 has in his hands a new commentary on the " Kritik." Is 

 any fresh hght thrown on the schematism of the cate- 

 gories, or on the number and derivation of the categories 

 themselves ? Are we enabled to understand better the 

 precise value of the7princip]e of causation, or the prin- 

 ciple of the permanence of substance? Above all, shall 

 we be satisfied to accept the second and first editions of the 

 *' Kritik" as alike containing the true gospel of Kantianism, 

 or are we to be left to suppose that there is a serious di- 

 vergence between the earlier and later edition, especially 

 in reference to idealism and the refutation of Berkeley 1 

 These are a few salient points out of many others on 

 which we look for guidance to some fresh commentator. 

 In the case of one of these, we have for some time been 

 aware of Dr. Mahaffy's opinion. We know that in his 

 early version of Kuno Fischer's " Commentary " he was 

 dissatisfied with that philosopher's treatment of Kant on 

 the subject of idealism. Dr. Mahaffy returns to the 

 charge in the present edition (in which he has the 

 •collaboration of Mr. Bernard), perhaps in some measure 

 stirred to resume the controversy by the discovery that 

 Kuno Fischer in his recent "Critique of Kant" (1882) 

 had not found reason to alter his original views. As the 

 point is an important one, and as Dr. Mahaffy would 

 probably himself select its treatment as the most cha- 

 racteristic contribution which his new edition has to 

 offer to the better comprehension of Kant, we shall 

 attempt as briefly as possible to lay the question at issue 

 ■before our readers. 



It was Schopenhauer who decisively stigmatized the 

 second edition of the " Kritik" as inferior to its predecessor. 

 Kant, he declared, had become alarmed at the idealistic 

 conclusions which had been drawn from his principles, 

 and proceeded to mutilate the earlier version of his 

 doctrines by suppression of some passages, and alteration 

 -of others. There was one paragraph especially, inserted 

 into the deduction of the categories, which stated in the 

 most explicit terms that the " matter " of our intuitions is 

 ■derived from a source independent of the understanding ; 

 and there was the comparatively long excursus intro- 

 duced under the heading of a "Refutation of Idealism," 

 which seemed expressly intended to reassure those who 

 thought that Kant had taken up the position of Berkeley. 

 Hence the conclusion was drawn that Kant, "in the 

 weakness of old age," had compromised with the Realists, 

 and that the second edition, in consequence, was by no 

 means so clear and consistent an exposition of Kant's 

 «own opinions as the one it was intended to supersede. 



It is this opinion (which others besides Schopenhauer 

 have entertained) which Dr. Mahaffy sets himself to 

 oppose. He draws attention, in the first place, to Kant's 

 own words in his preface, which contain the most un- 

 qualified statement of the practical identity of the two' 

 editions. " In the positions themselves," says Kant, " and 

 in the grounds of proof, as well as in the form and com- 

 pleteness of the plan, I have found nothing to alter ; " and 

 again, '• my present exposition, in substance, as regards 

 the propositions, and even in their method of proof 

 changes absolutely nothitig, while it varies from the 

 former here and there in the method of the exposition 

 in such a manner as could not be managed by interpola- 

 tion." These words are certainly explicit enough, and if 

 we are to venture to disregard them, as Kuno Fischer has 

 done, it can only be because on such a question the 

 opinion of the author himself is perhaps not wholly trust- 

 worthy, or at all events ought not to be allowed to over- 

 balance the evidence derived from a comparison of the 

 editions. Such a comparison Dr. Mahaffy himself under- 

 takes, and is thereby led to the conclusion that Kant's 

 own judgment was right, and that of his critics was 

 wrong. On the whole, it may be conceded that Dr. 

 Mahaffy makes out his case, but even he would probably 

 allow that the general tendency of the second edition is 

 to accentuate Kant's avoidance of the idealistic position, 

 and to effect, by a not too successful criticism of Berkeley, 

 a reconciliation with the realistic position. Such a ten- 

 dency is undoubtedly absent in the first edition. Indeed, 

 Dr. Mahaffy admits, in a note on p. 23, that " it may be 

 that Kant was somewhat frightened at the charge of 

 Eerkeleianism " ; and the history of the controversy on this 

 point given by Dr. Stirhng in the eighth volume of Mind 

 entirely confirms the opinion that in some fashion the 

 effect produced by the first edition was one which Kant 

 set himself to alter. 



One of the important passages is, of course, the 

 "Refutation of Idealism," which, although it was not 

 wholly new, but had already been outlined in the first 

 edition among the " paralogisms," still deserved the 

 attention which the German critics gave to it because 

 of the new position and importance which it assumed in 

 the revised version. Is it the case, as the Idealists 

 assumed, that the intimations of the inner sense (internal 

 experience) are more trustworthy than the intimations of 

 the outer sense (external experience) ? May we rightly 

 argue from sensations to the percipient who is the subject 

 of the sensations, although we are debarred from arguing 

 from sensations to the "matter" or external object to 

 which the sensations are referred as their cause ? Accord- 

 ing to the " Refutation of Idealism," Berkeley is clearly 

 wrong : both inner sense and outer sense have precisely 

 the same validity, inasmuch as both yield us " phenomena " 

 of the same value : while it is also suggested that were it 

 not for the permanent object of sensation, no sense of 

 change, no sequence in the intimations of the inner sense, 

 would be possible at all. Dr. Mahaffy devotes a chapter 

 (chap, xiv.) to the discussion of this question, and we 

 venture to think that there is no part of his work which more 

 deserves an attentive perusal. We would especially point 

 to the passages in which he discusses the precise meaning 

 of Kant's principle of permanence (pp. 212 et seq.). 

 Berkeley's polemic against matter was a disproof of the 



